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I. INTRODUCTION
In an effort to avoid the delay, expense, technicality, and acrimony of traditional
judicial litigation, a movement has emerged for parties to use forms of alternative
dispute resolution ("ADR").1 In these processes, the parties typically agree to submit
their disputes before a private third-party neutral, who would either decide, as in
arbitration, or facilitate, as in mediation, a resolution of the parties' disputes. ADR
is premised upon the intention that by providing disputing parties with a process that
is confidential, voluntary, adaptable to the needs and interests of the parties, and
within party control, a more satisfying, durable, and efficient resolution of disputes
may be achieved.
Seeing the opportunities for ADR to address problems of court congestion and
expense, judicial systems at both the state and federal levels have adopted court-
annexed ADR programs in which litigants, often as a precondition to trial orjudicial
resolution, submit to some form of ADR, such as arbitration, mediation, or summary
jury trial.2 The use of court-ordered participation in ADR has been lauded for
increasing settlement rates and providing a forum for more creative, efficient, and
satisfying resolutions of disputes, yet criticized as "coerced settlement" and an
additional obstacle and expense in the litigation process.
1. KATHERINE V.W. STONE, PRIVATE JUSTICE: THE LAW OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION2-4 (2000) (noting that the 1976 Pound Conference-here Chief Justice Warren
Burger urged greater use of ADR and Professor Frank E. Sander proposed a "multi-door
courthouse" in which judicial disputes are screened and referred to an appropriate ADR
forum--signified the beginning of the modem ADR movement); Developments in the
Law-The Paths of Civil Litigation, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1851, 1851-57 (2000) (reviewing the
history of the modem ADR movement). ADR encompasses a variety of processes for dispute
resolution outside of formal judicial litigation, which generally involve a third-party neutral to
assist in reaching resolution of a dispute, including mediation, arbitration, early neutral case
evaluation, minitrial, summary jury trial, and private judging. KIMBERLEE K. KOVACH,
MEDIATION: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 6 (2d ed. 2000).
2. See Lisa Bernstein, Understandingthe Limits of Court-ConnectedADR: A Critique of
Federal Court-Annexed Arbitration Programs, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 2169, 2176-86 (1993)
(describing basic features of federal court-annexed arbitration programs). In court-annexed
programs, parties may elect the outcome reached in an ADR proceeding to be binding or
nonbinding. Id.; see also id. at 2172 n.3 (noting that as of 1988, twenty-two states and the
District of Columbia operated some type ofcourt-annexed arbitration program for civil claims).
3. Kathleen A. Devine, Note,AlternativeDisputeResolution: Policies, Participation, and
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A growing concern lies in the use of private compulsory ADR resulting from
mandatory predispute arbitration or ADR provisions in contracts (contractual or
private ADR). Contractual ADR provisions appear not only in commercial
transactions between businesses, but more frequently in corporate-consumer
transactions and employment contracts.4 These provisions mayrequire private dispute
resolution of contractual as well as statutory, civil rights, and consumer protection
claims. Unlike court-mandated ADR, where the parties are ordered to ADR but
ultimately retain the right to ajudicial trial, parties subject to private mandatory ADR
by contract are effectively precluded from judicial recourse.6
As a result of laws providing for court-annexed ADR and the proliferation of
mandatory predispute contractual ADR clauses, more and more parties are ironically
forced to use ADR processes. The expanded use of ADR has spawned an industry
of individuals and both nonprofit and for-profit entities providing ADR services to
act as third-party neutrals.7 Although some ADR service providers have adopted
precatory standards and codes of ethics for ADR neutrals,8 and efforts are underway
Proposals, I1 REv. LrIG. 83, 89-92 (1991) (summarizing policy arguments for and against
ADR); see also G. Thomas Eisele, The Case Against Mandatory Court-Annexed ADR
Programs, 75 JUDICATURE 34,36 (1991).
4. See Paul H. Haagen, New WineskinsforNew Wine: The Need to Encourage Fairness
in Mandatory Arbitration, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1039, 1063-67 (1998); John Vail, Defeating
MandatoryArbitration Clauses: What'saLawyertoDo When BoilerplateArbitration Clauses
Bar the Courthouse Door?, TRIAL, Jan. 2000, at 70, 70 (discussing widespread use of
mandatory arbitration clauses in consumer transaction), available at http://www.atla.org/
homepage/triaj00.ht; Ass'n of Trial Lawyers of Am, Mandatory Arbitration: The NextAttack
on Consumers' Rights, at http://www.atla.orgl homepage/arbi0319.ht (last visited Feb. 21,
2001) (employment and consumer context).
5. Edward F. Sherman, Court-MandatedAlternative Dispute Resolution: What Form of
Participation ShouldBe Required?, 46 SMU L. REV. 2079, 2092 (1993) (noting that "[t]he
failure of [a court-connected] ADR proceeding simply means that the parties are relegated to
their basic constitutional right to trial"). Contra, e.g., Bemstein, supra note 2, at 2183 (noting
that courts have imposed sanctions or struck a party's demand for a trial de novo for failure to
participate in court-ordered ADR in good faith); infra Part IV.C.
6. See infra Part IV.B (noting limited judicial remedies for vacatur of ADR awards or
agreements procured by fraud, duress, or other defenses under contract law).
7. See Bernstein, supra note 2, at 2186 (reporting that "[b]etween 1983 and 1988, the
number of private ADR providers has increased tenfold.... In addition to for-profit and not-
for-profit fee-for-service ADR providers, over 150 grass-roots ADR organizations currently
provide dispute resolution services either free or at a minimal cost"); Jack M. Sabatino, ADR
as "LitigationLite" ProceduralandEvidentiaryNons Embedded WithinAlternative Dispute
Resolution, 47 EMORY L.J. 1289, 1301 (1998) (describing three leading national private ADR
service providers).
8. See, e.g., MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS (Am. Arbitrators Ass'n et
al. 1994), available at http://www.abanet.org/ftp/pub/dispute/modstan.txt [hereinafter MODEL
STANDARDS]; NAT'L RULEs FOR THE RESOLUToN OF EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES 3-4 (Am.
Arbitration Ass'n 1996) (providing apolicy to "administer dispute resolution programs which
meet the due process standards as outlined in these rules and the Due Process Protocol");
JAMS/Endispute Arbitration Policy, 9A Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 142, 534:521 (Mar. 26,
1996) (willing to process employment disputes if a"minimum set of procedures or standards
of procedural fairness" are met); Due Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of
2001]
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to establish some uniform guidelines for ADR practice,9 the industry is largely
unregulated. Individuals acting as ADR neutrals generally need not have any
particular training, education, knowledge of the law, or other experience.'0 Standards
of conduct for the parties and lawyers in an ADR process are even less defined and
largely assumed to comport with the voluntary nature of the ADR process."
The proclaimedbenefits ofchannelingdisputes through aprivate dispute-resolution
forum are that it offers a faster, less costly, and more palatable environment for
parties to resolve their disputes free from the technical, procedural, evidentiary, and
appellate rigors ofjudicial adjudication. To encourage party candor and compromise,
the ADR processes are typically conducted in a private, confidential forum between
the parties (and counsel, if desired), and before a private third-party neutral, usually
selected by one or more of the parties. It is precisely the informality and private
environment of ADR-perceived benefits of the system-that also raise concerns
about the fairness of the process. Because ADR processes are cloaked with
confidentiality privileges, conducted by private third-party neutrals who are
unaccountable to the public or judicial system and not bound to follow or apply the
law, and often imposed on unwilling or weaker parties through the use of adhesive
contractual clauses, the concern, or at least perception, that participants may abuse
the ADR process comes to the forefront.
Early critics of ADR warned that the lack of formal procedural protections and
ADR's privacy may disadvantage weaker parties in denying the due process
protections of adjudication that can equalize power, thwart the development of legal
precedent and rules, and undermine the protection of statutory rights, civil rights, and
consumer protection claims by an emphasis on compromising (or disregarding) legal
rights. 2 Others raised the possibility that third-party neutrals lack the expertise to
Statutory Employment Disputes, 9A Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 142, 534:401 (May 9, 1995).
9. See, e.g., UNIF. MEDIATION ACT (Proposed Draft Feb. 2000) (drafting proposed
uniform legislation and/or court rules for various aspects of mediation practice for state
adoption), available at http://www.pon.harvard.edu/guests/uma/febwebUMA.htn-L
10. Cf. LEONARDL. RisKiN&JAMESE. WESTBROOK, DISPUTE RESOLUTIONAND LAWYERS
699 (2d ed. 1997). Neutrals associated with a particular ADR service organization or qualified
to serve in connection with a court-annexed ADR program generally must satisfy the training,
education, and experience qualifications set forth by that organization or program. See supra
note 8. However, there is no licensing requirement, and one may serve as a private mediator
or arbitrator simply when so engaged by the parties. See, e.g., UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 3(B)(5)
(Proposed Draft Feb. 2000) (defining "mediator" to include "an individual, of any profession
or background, who is appointed by a court or government entity, or engaged by
parties under an agreement evidenced by a record to conduct a mediation'), available at
http://www.pon.harvard.edu/guestsuma/febwebUMA.htnr, 1 SARAH R. COLE, NANCY H.
ROGERS & CRAIG A. MCEWEN, MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY, PRACTICE § 11:04 (2d ed. 1994 &
Supp. 2000) (discussing mediator accountability) [hereinafter ROGERS & MCEwEN].
11. The proposed Uniform Mediation Act ("UMA") does not address participant conduct;
neither do professional codes of responsibility specifically address a lawyer's role in an ADR
setting. A proposed rule for adoption into the Model Rules of Professional Conduct pertains
to lawyers (not to nonlawyers) serving as a third-party neutral, not to lawyers acting as
representatives or advocates in an ADR proceeding. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
R. 2.4 (Final Draft Nov. 2000), http://www.abanet.orgcpr/e2k-rule24.html.
12. See, e.g., Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of
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decide the legal rights of the parties or may unduly pressure or coerce parties into
settlement 3 Questions portend that "repeat player" corporate entities have systemic
advantages, due to a seeming propensity for a third-party neutral, whose employment
depends upon continued referrals, to favor the stronger party over "one-shotters," or
individuals with less bargainingpower. ' Acknowledgingthese criticisms, proponents
maintain that ADR may still be preferable to litigation for both corporate entities and
individuals, provided that the parties engage in the process in good faith and minimal
quality safeguards exist.'5 Indeed, for ADR to achieve its intended objectives of
efficiency and effectiveness, it becomes imperative, in this age of compulsory and
often binding ADR, to ensure a minimal level of procedural fairness. 6
As the use of compulsory ADR continues to rise, concerns that behind the closed
doors of an ADR proceeding participants may engage in abusive conduct, use the
process simply as a subterfuge for discovery, or fail to participate in a meaningful
matter raise the questions of what can be done to address participant misconduct or
abuse in ADR1 7 and to ensure basic procedural fairness." Legislation and local court
Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WiS. L. REV. 1359; Owen M. Fiss, Against
Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085 (1984).
13. Haagen, supra note 4, at 1053 (noting that "arbitrators may be wholly unqualified to
handle the matters submitted to them, and theirjudgments are generally immune fromreview");
Kimberlee K. Kovach, Good Faith in Mediation-Requested, Recommended, or Required? A
New Ethic, 38 S. TEX L. REv. 575, 583 (1997) (providing examples of mediator coercion).
14. See, e.g., Sarah R. Cole, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the (Alternative)
Forum: ReexaminingAlexanderv. Gardner-Denver in the Wake ofGilmerv. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp., 1997 BYU L. REV. 591, 619-24 (discussing the advantages repeat-player
employers have when negotiating contracts and later participating in dispute resolution with
one-shot-player employees); Mark Galanter, Whythe "Haves" Come OutAhead: Speculations
on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 95 (1974) (discussing the systemic
advantages of "repeat players" in the civil justice system over individuals or "one-shotters");
see also Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Seres., Inc., 105 F.3d 1465, 1485 nn.16-17 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(recognizing the concern that neutrals have a financial interest to favor employers, as repeat
players, and that empirical studies demonstrate favoritism based on party who selects, rather
than pays, the neutral).
15. See, e.g., James J. Alfini, Trashing, Bashing, and Hashing It Out: Is This the End of
"Good Mediation"?, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 47, 62-63 (1991) (reporting that attorneys
interviewed regarding the problem of other attorneys or parties "just showing up" for court-
ordered mandatory mediation believed the problemis best addressed by imposing a good-faith
requirement, with appropriate sanctions, on the recalcitrant party); Samuel Estreicher,
Predispute Agreements toArbitrate Statutory Employment Claims, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1344,
1349-50 (1997) (defending the enforcement of mandatory arbitration of statutory employment
claims provided that a number of "essential safeguards" are in place to ensure fairness of the
arbitration); Kovach, supra note 13, at 592 (advocating a good-faith requirement in mediation).
16. 1 ROGERs & MCEWEN, supra note 10, § 6:02, at 2 n.1 (noting that the "[g]oals for
federal court dispute resolution include preservation of fairness, speed in resolution, and
preservation of 'weaker parties' access to information and power to negotiate a dispute'
(quoting COMM. ON LONG RANGE PLANNING, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF TME U.S., PROPOSED
LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 65-66, 125-26 (1995))).
17. See Haagen, supra note 4, at 1041 (stating that "the power conferred on private parties
to use mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses to avoid litigation in the courts has been
abused"); id. at 1041 n.22 (citing Bard Bole, As Arbitration Grows in Popularity, Courts Try
2001]
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rules providing for court-annexed ADR programs increasingly include provisions
requiring parties to participate in court-ordered ADR "in good faith" or "in a
meaningful manner." 9 Through their authority inherently, under procedural rules, or
by legislation, courts sanction parties for violations of a good-faith-participation
requirement such as for failing to attend or participate in an ADR process or engaging
in a pattern of obstructive, abusive, or dilatory tactics.2° Sanctions include the shifting
of costs and attorneys fees, contempt, denial of trial de novo, and even dismissal of
the lawsuit.21 By contrast, participants in a private ADR setting lack comparable
judicial oversight or regulation. In either forum, however, imposing participation
requirements and sanctions for violations thereof creates tension with other policies
designed to ensure confidentiality, third-partyneutrality, process flexibility, andparty
autonomy.
This Article examines situations in which participants inside of an ADR procedure
misuse the process, act in bad faith, or otherwise engage in improper conduct and
further considers whether abuses of process or participant misconduct require
disclosure, sanction, or independent liability.' Part II briefly describes the
development and purpose of ADR and the trend toward, as well as judicial
enforcement of, compulsory ADIL Part E[I explores fairness and process concerns
with the expanded use of compulsory ADR, while Part IV examines the judicial and
legislative responses to participant misconduct in court-annexedADR. Part V focuses
on legal theories that provide recourse against participant misconduct and process
abuse in a private contractual, rather than court-annexed, ADR setting and examines
the impact of confidentiality privileges on the viability of proving and sanctioning
misconduct arising out of an ADR procedure. This Article asserts that participants in
private ADR are subject, as a matter of contract law, to an implied obligation to
participate in the ADR process in good faith. Accordingly, misconduct and abuse of
an ADR process are actionable. Further, public policies favoring confidentiality in
to Curb Abuses, LmG. NEWS, Mar. 1998, at 3 ("This environment has resulted in efforts to
draft arbitration clauses that clearly favor one party or, although faciallyneutral, have the effect
of favoring one side ofthe dispute.")).
18. Similar concerns of misconduct or process abuses in the civil justice system are
addressed through federal procedural rules such as Rule 1 l(providing penalties for frivolous
filings or contentious or harassing or vexatious conduct in representations to the court), Rule
37 (covering abuses in discovery), and Rule 16(f) (authorizing sanctions if parties or their
attorneys do not comply with terms of a court's pretrial conference order, are "substantially
unprepared to participate," or fail "to participate in good faith"). FED. R. CIv. P. 11, 16(f), 37.
Unlike ADR, the civil justice system also provides for a myriad of procedural and evidentiary
protections, such as rights to discovery, jury trial, and appellate review.
19. See infra Part IV.C.
20. See infra Part IV.C; infra note 77; see also Richard P. English, Annotation,Alternative
Dispute Resolution: Sanctions for Failure to Participate in Good Faith in, or Comply with
Agreement Made in, Mediation, 43 A.L.R.Sth 545, §§ 10-14.5, 22 (1996 & Supp. 2000).
21. See infra Part IV.C; infra note 77; English, supra note 20, §§ 10-14.5, 22.
22. See infra Part V. Professor Kovach provides an excellent analysis and endorsement of
a good-faith-participation requirement in court-ordered mediation. See Kovach, supra note 13.
This Article explores options for redressing misconduct or process abuse of various ADR
processes in a private ADR setting where there is no court order or legislative rule mandating
good-faith participation and where confidentiality privilege statutes may or may not apply.
[Vol. 76:591
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ADR must be tempered to permit disclosure of participant misconduct in order to
effectuate the good-faith obligation. The Article concludes by proposing a standard
for a good-faith-participation requirement in private ADR, while balancing the
competing policy concerns attendant with such an obligation, and presents a method
for reconciling the need for good-faith participation, party autonomy, and
confidentiality.
H1. AN OVERVIEW OF ADR
A. Development and Intent
ADR is regarded by many as a welcome and desirable alternative to a costly,
protracted, and adversarial process usually found in judicial litigation.' Voluntary
binding arbitration and mediation are the most prevalent forms of ADR In
arbitration, the parties typically agree to present their cases before a third-party
neutral, who, after hearing arguments and reviewing evidence, renders a final and
binding decision upon the parties. Claimed benefits of arbitration are that it offers a
more informal, less expensive, and efficient forum for resolving disputes. 4 The rules
of evidence generally do not apply, discovery and motions practices are not used, and
the decision rendered is final, with essentially no appeal.' The arbitrators may be
selected for their expertise in aparticular subject area,' albeit notnecessarily for their
23. See RISKIN &WESTBROOK, supra note 10, at 694-709 (citing NAT'LINST. FORDISPUTE
RESOLUTION, PATHS TO JUSTICE: MAJOR PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 3-4,
7-24,30 (1983) (describing advantages and disadvantages of arbitration and mediation)); Jean
R. Sternhight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's Preference for
Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 678 (1996) (noting that Chief Justice Warren
Burger was a strong, early advocate touting ADR as a cheaper, quicker, and final forum to
resolve disputes); Devine, supra note 3, at 89 (noting that ADR permits a fuller exploration of
the underlying dispute, party control of the process, creative solutions, and "a more durable
solution by restoring, preserving, or enhancing the parties' relationship").
24. See, e.g., Arthur A. Chaykin, Mediator Liability: A New Role for Fiduciary Duties?,
53 U. CIN. L. REv. 731, 733 (1984) (describing advantages of arbitration). Others note that
arbitration/ADR is not necessarily cheaper or more efficient. See, e.g., Kim Dayton, The Myth
ofAlternative Dispute Resolution in the Federal Courts, 76 IOWA L. REV. 889, 924 (1991)
(analyzing empirical data comparing federal districts that used mandatory arbitration with those
that did not and finding that "ADR districts are not more efficient or effective in addressing
their caseloads as a result of using ADR when compared with the peer districts"); Paul D.
Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract andJurisdiction, 1996 SuP. CT. REV. 331, 384 (noting
that in most arbitrations and mediations, the parties must pay administrative fees that are
generally higher than court filing fees as well as pay fees to the third-party neutral or panel of
arbitrators).
25. See RISKJN & WESTBROOK, supra note 10, at 698-99, 709; Chaykin, supra note 24, at
734; Sabatino, supra note 7, at 1339; see also 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1994) (providing limited grounds
for judicial review of arbitral awards).
26. RISKIN & WESTBROOK, supra note 10, at 699. Unless required by a specific court or
program, a person may act as an arbitrator or mediator with neither licensing, nor an
educational or law degree required. SeeAlexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36,57 (1974)
(noting that arbitral process is "comparatively inferior to the judicial processes in the protection
2001)
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expertise in the law. Arbitration has traditionally been used in labor and commercial
arenas "where the parties have an ongoing relationship, disputes frequently arise, and
resolution depends on the correct disposition of a specialized body of facts and
law.
27
Unlike arbitration, mediation is nonbinding, and the mediator has no power to
impose settlement on the parties. The mediator, as a third-party neutral, ideally
facilitates communication and negotiations between parties andprovides a conducive
forum to help them gain an understanding of each other's interests and to achieve a
joint resolution. Although at times criticized as compromisingthe sense ofneutrality
or even constituting the practice of law, a mediator may also play the role of
"evaluating" the strengths and weaknesses of a party's case. Despite the possibility
of influence by a mediator, the parties retain ultimate decision making authority.30 A
mediated agreement does become an enforceable contract 1
The anticipated benefits of both forms of ADR include its cost-effectiveness,
efficiency, confidentiality, party control, and even a therapeutic opportunity for
consenting parties to tell their stories and have direct input and control over resolving
conflicts.32 Because of the frequent cost-prohibitiveness and win-or-lose risks of
vindicating one's rights in a judicial forum, the intent was that willing parties could
elect to use ADR to resolve their disputes.3 A basic tenet of ADR is that both
arbitration and mediation are consensual processes.3
of Title VII rights" because, inter alia, the arbitrator generally has specialized knowledge in
"the law of the shop, not the law of the land," whereas the courts have primary responsibility
to interpret statutory or constitutional issues and ensure consistent application of important
public rights).
27. Chaykin, supra note 24, at 734.
28. RIsKIN & WESTBROOK, supra note 10, at 699-700; Chaykin, supra note 24, at 734-35
(defining mediation).
29. See BD. OF GOVERNORS, N.C. BAR Ass'N, GUIDELINES FOR THE ETHICALPRACTICE OF
MEDIATION AND TO PREVENT THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW (1999) (prohibiting
evaluative mediation); Kimberlee K. Kovach & Lela P. Love, "Evaluative" Mediation Is an
Oxymoron, 14 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITG. 31 (1996) (criticizing evaluative
mediation); see also News andAnalysis: Virginia Guidelines on Mediation and Unauthorized
Practice of Law Examined, ADR REPORT, Oct. 13, 1999, at 2-4 (same); MASS. SUP. JUD. CT.
R. 1:18, § 9(cXiv) ("A neutral ... shall not provide legal advice....").
30. STONE, supra note 1, at 33; see also Sabatino, supra note 7, at 1297.
31. 1 ROGERS&McEWEN, supranote 10, § 11:01, at3.
32. See also, e.g., RSKIN & WESTBROOK, supra note 10, at 699-700 (describing advantages
of ADR); Robert A. Baruch Bush, Efficiency and Protection, or Empowerment and
Recognition?: The Mediator's Role and Ethical Standards in Mediation, 41 FIA. L. REV. 253
(1989) (noting that the benefits of mediation include self-determined resolutions and
empowerment); Stemlight, supra note 23, at 680 (noting that proponents of arbitration cite
purported advantages of speed, economy, finality, privacy, and preserved relationships).
33. See, e.g., UNIF. MEDIATION ACT, prefatory note (Proposed Draft Feb. 2001)
(emphasizing fundamental principle of self-determination), available at http://www.pon.
harvard.edu/guests/uma/febwebUMA.htm Sherman, supra note 5, at 2083 (arguing that
mediation is a voluntary, consensual process in which the parties are empowered to seek their
own solutions with the aid of a mediator facilitator).
34. See Bernstein, supra note 2, at 2242-44.
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B. Trend Toward Compulsory ADR
ADR has traditionally been used where both parties have agreed, either in advance
or after a dispute has arisen, to submit their dispute to a private forum. In recent
years, however, there has been substantial growth in the use of mandatory ADR in
judicial and private contractual settings 5
1. Court-Annexed ADR Programs
State and federal courts increasingly order parties to utilize ADR processes,
including arbitration, mediation, summary jury trial, and neutral third-party case
evaluation, as a prerequisite to trial or even appellate review 6 Although procedural
rules, such as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 (and state counterparts)," provide
courts discretion to employ extrajudicial procedures for settlement purposes, the use
of ADR in the civil courts has become more institutionalized and systematic. For
example, the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 199838 requires all ninety-four
federal district courts to implement ADR programs and authorizes the federal courts
to compel parties' participation in mediation, early neutral evaluation, and
arbitration. 9 Compulsory court-annexed ADR programs at the state levels are
35. See STONE, supra note 1, at 799 (discussing court-annexed ADR programs); Haagen,
supra note 4, at 1040-41; Jean R. Stemlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality ofthe Supreme
Court's Preferencefor Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment ofJury Trial, Separation of
Powers, andDue Process Concerns, 72 TUL L. REV. 1,5 (1997); Vail, supra note 4 (providing
numerous examples of mandatory arbitration uses).
36. See STONE, supra note 1, at 799 (describing growth in court-connected ADR
programs). Stone asserts:
In recent years, mediation has been used increasingly in settings in which it is not
the result of a voluntary agreement between two disputing parties but rather
imposed by law or by a court. Some courts have adopted local rules requiring
parties to attempt to mediate certain categories of disputes before they can have
their dispute placed on a trial calendar. Also, some states have enacted laws
requiring that all disputes of a certain type be mediated before they can be heard
in court.
Id. at 34; see also 1 ROGERS & McEWEN, supra note 10, § 5:03, at 146 (reporting that "[a]t
least half the states now have mediation programs"); Peter S. Chantilis, Mediation US.A., 26
U. MEM. L. REv. 1031 (1996) (surveying the status of ADR and mediation legislation and
programs in fifty states).
37. FED. R. Civ. P. 16 (authorizing federal district courts to order litigants to participate in
pretrial proceedings, including hearings to facilitate settlement, and to impose sanctions for
failure to comply with pretrial orders).
38. 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-658 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); see also Administrative Dispute
Resolution Act, 5 U.S.C. § 571 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (requiring federal agencies to each
"adopt a policy that addresses the use of alternative means of dispute resolution and case
management"); Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)-(b) (1994) (requiring
"pilot" districts to refer appropriate cases to ADR programs); Sabatino, supra note 7, at 1299
(noting that "'ADR' has become a mantra of national policy, with governments at all levels
promoting its use").




2. Private Compulsory ADR
It has been a longstanding practice for merchants or commercial entities of
relatively equal bargaining power to contract before a dispute arises for a mandatory
private resolution in lieu ofjudicial adjudication.4 A more controversial use of ADR
lies in the use and enforcement of form-compulsory ADR or predispute binding-
arbitration clauses that increasingly appear in ordinary consumer transactions,
medical service provisions, and employment contracts.42 These clauses not only
preclude access to the public courts but also may set the terms of the ADR process,
such as the payment of fees, the forum, and selection of the neutral and may contain
other provisions restricting the limitations period, class actions, or damages
recovery.43
C. Judicial Preference for ADR
The widespread use of private mandatory ADR provisions, particularly in
consumer and employment" situations and where statutory and public-law disputes
are involved, has been the subject of substantial debate.45 Critics argue that, unlike
court-annexed binding arbitration).
40. See, e.g., Chantilis, supra note 36, at 1034-82 (surveying fifty states' rules regarding
court-mandated mediation).
41. See Sarah &. Cole, Incentives and Arbitration: The Case Against Enforcement of
ExecutoryArbitration AgreementsBetween Employers and Employees, 64 UMKCL.REV. 449,
459-60 (1996) (discussing reasons why merchants chose arbitration as their preferred means
for resolving disputes); Sternlight, supra note 23, at 647 (asserting that the Federal Arbitration
Act was envisioned to apply to consensual transactions between merchants).
42. Haagen, supra note 4, at 1041-42 (reporting that employers now subject millions of
their employees to these agreements and that the EEOC "recently called the widespread use of
mandatory arbitration agreements in employment 'the greatest threat to Civil Rights
enforcement' today" (citation omitted)).
43. Sternlight, supra note 35, at 5; see also Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147,
1148 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding arbitration clause in lengthy warranty at the bottom of computer
box enforceable); Sagal v. First USA Bank, 69 F. Supp. 2d. 267 (D. Del. 1999) (enforcing
arbitration clause in consumer class action based on amendment to credit cardholder
agreement); Stemlight, supra note 23, at 691 ("Arbitration clauses are often buried in
seemingly insignificant places, camouflaged as insignificant junk mail, written in very small
print, and written in technical terms not likely to be meaningful to most.").
44. The Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") contains ambiguous language excepting contracts
of employment. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). See Estreicher, supra note 15, at 1363-72 (noting
controversy of whether the FAA provision excepts general employment contracts or only
contracts pertaining to employment in the transportation industry). The Supreme Court recently
granted review to determine whether the FAA applies to contracts of employment. Circuit City
Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 194 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 1999) (only circuit holding that FAA does not
apply to contracts of employment), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 2004 (2000).
45. See Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arbitral Justice: The Demise ofDue Process in American
Law, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1945, 1967 (1996) (arguing that arbitration "is being exploited as a tool
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traditional agreements between commercial entities, many consumer or employee
mandatory ADR agreements are not the product of an arm' s-length transaction or true
negotiation but are presented on a "take-it-or-leave-it" basis by the party in a position
of economic power. These clauses deprive parties of a jury trial, discovery, and
appellate and due process rights inherent in a civil justice system.47 Notwithstanding,
courts uphold the vast majority of these provisions, guided by a substantial body of
U.S. Supreme Court precedent pronouncing a strong national policy in favor of
agreements to arbitrate or to resolve disputes in private forums.4" The FAA 49 and
by which to achieve a surreptitious reduction ofjustice services in our society"); Cole, supra
note 41, at 452 (arguing that predispute arbitration agreements should be enforced only when
the incentives and ability of the parties to negotiate is similar); Harry T. Edwards, Alternative
Disputes Resolution: Panacea orAnathema?, 99 HARV. L. REV. 668,684 (1986) (arguing that
public-law issues should be removed from ADR); David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print
to Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer Right Claims in an Age of Compelled
Arbitration, 1997 Wis. L. REV. 33, 36 (stating "the Supreme Court has created a monster");
Stemlight, supra note 23, at 674-97 (arguing that the U.S. Supreme Court's preference for
arbitration has no legitimate basis in legislative history and that neither economic nor other
policy arguments support a policy allowing large companies to impose possibly unfair
arbitration clauses on ignorant consumers and employees).
46. See Cole, supra note4l, at 475 (arguing thatpredispute arbitration agreementsbetween
employers and employees should not be enforced because employees have little incentive or
ability to negotiate terms with an employer and routinely discount the likelihood that they will
ultimately engage in a dispute with their employer); Haagen, supra note 4, at 1052 (noting that
the traditional reasons for parties agreein to arbitration, such as common interest, equal
bargaining power, and ongoing relationships, are generally not existent in most consumer and
employee cases); Stemlight, supra note 35, at 7 n.17 (noting the numerous contexts of
consumer-binding contractual arbitration clauses and stating that "while binding arbitration is
also well established in many commercial contexts where two equal parties bargain for
arbitration rather than litigation to allow for application of industry standards, it is quite a
different matter for companies to mandate arbitration in consumer and employee contracts"
(citation omitted)).
47. Sternlight, supra note 35, at 26-81.
48. See, eg., Allied-Bruce Terminex Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995) (concluding the
FAA covers the full range of Congress's commerce powers and thus applying the FAA to an
agreement between a homeowner and local pest-extermination company); Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20,26 (1991) ("[B]y agreeing to arbitrate ... aparty
does not forgo the substantive rights;... it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather
than ajudicial, forum." (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,
473 U.S. 614,628 (1985))); Rodriquez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477,
481 (1989) (citing federal policy favoring arbitration in holdingthat securities fraud claims are
arbitrable); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 227 (1987) (stating that
because of the federal preference for arbitration, "the burden is on the party opposing
arbitration... to show that Congress intended to preclude a waiver ofjudicial remedies for the
statutory rights at issue"); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 626 (1985) (finding federal statutory antitrust claim subject to foreign arbitration); Moses
H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (announcing that
"questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy
favoring arbitration").
49. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994). The FAA provides for the judicial enforcement of contracts
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basic contract doctrine are thebasis upon which courts enforce mandatory agreements
to use ADR in lieu of adjudication. For example, employers and industry saw the
green light to use compulsory arbitration after the Court's 1991 decision in Gilmer
v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., ° which upheld the mandatory arbitration of an
employee's federal statutory age-discrimination claim. The Court rejected the
employee's argument that arbitration was inconsistent with statutory purposes, due
to inadequate procedural protections, such as the risk ofpanel bias, limited discovery,
lack of written opinions, or unequal bargaining power."' Since Gilmer, courts have
routinely enforced mandatory arbitration clauses in employment and consumer
contracts without regard to generalized arguments of process unfairness or that the
plaintiff did not read, understand, or consent to the provision. 2 Just recently, the
Supreme Court upheld enforcement of a mandatory arbitration clause that required
consumers to submit to arbitration, even though the clause was silent as to the issue
to arbitrate and governs the vast range of transactions involving interstate commerce. Id. § 2
("[A] written provision... to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such
contract or transaction... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."); see also Stephen J. Ware,
Consumer Arbitration as Exceptional Consumer Law (with a Contractualist Reply to
Carrington and Haagen), 29 MCGEORGE L. REv. 195, 202-10 (1998) (defending the
contractual approach for enforcement of mandatory arbitration contracts and asserting that
extant contract defenses are sufficient to protect consumers); cf. Sternlight, supra note 35, at
23 (arguing the Supreme Court interprets contractual defenses to arbitration far too narrowly).
50. 500 U.S. 20,26 (1991).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 30; see also Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465,1485 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(acknowledging the potential inequities of arbitration in individual employment cases and the
concerns about the competence of arbitrators and the arbitral forum to enforce worker
protection laws but stating that Gilmer requires enforcement). The tide may be starting to shift,
as more courts are beginning to more closely scrutinize arbitration agreements in the consumer
and employment context. See, e.g., Floss v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., 211 F.3d 306,
315 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding prehire arbitration agreement between employee and private
arbitration service hired by employer that authorizes provider to alter applicable rules and
procedures without notice to or consent of employee is void for lack of consideration); Hooters
of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 938 (4th Cir. 1999) ("Hooters materially breached the
arbitration agreement by promulgating rules so egregiously unfair as to constitute complete
default of its contractual obligation to draft arbitration rules and to do so in good faith."); Cole,
105 F.3d at 1485 (holding statutory claims not arbitrable where predispute arbitration
agreement required employee to pay all or part of arbitrator's fees); see also Rosenberg v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 995 F. Supp. 190,208 (D. Mass. 1998) (holding
arbitration impermissible where one of the parties had no role in arbitrator selection);
Broemmer v. Abortion Serv. of Phoenix, Ltd., 840 P.2d 1013 (Ariz. 1992) (holding adhesion
contract that had patient arbitrate malpractice claim and waive jury trial right unenforceable as
beyond patient's reasonable expectations). Various public and private ADR service providers
have promulgated advisory rules to regulate arbitration and ADR procedures in certain
consumer and employment contexts. See Task Force on Alternative Dispute Resolution in
Employment, A Due Process Protocolfor Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes
Arising out ofthe Employment Relationship, EU DISPUTE RESOL J., Oct-Dec. 1995, at 37-38
(calling for adequate discovery, right to representation by counsel, and impartial and diverse
arbitrators).
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of who pays and the consumer claimed arbitration expenses rendered her financially
unable to vindicate her statutoryrights. s While criticism against the Supreme Court's
expanded application of the FAAto mandatory employment and consumer arbitration
continues enforcement of these clauses is justified on a contractual theory. That is,
the employee or consumer had a "choice" to reject the mandatory ADR clause and
chose the job or service instead.55
Ell. FAIRNEss AND PROCESS CONCERNS WITH MANDATORY ADR
A. Potential Problems with Expanded Use of Compulsory ADR
Given that both court-ordered and contractual mandatory ADR practices are
increasingly common, what can be done to ensure fairness within the context ofthese
alternative processes? Whether by court order or private contract, the expanded use
of ADR raises a number of serious concerns. For instance, many parties are not there
"voluntarily," though voluntariness is one of the perceived tenets of making
alternative resolution viable.' In many cases, the parties are of unequal bargaining
power, usually one of whom is a "repeatplayer," with better familiarity of the process
and selection of third-party neutrals.' The neutrals are "hired" by the parties and,
unlike ful-timejudges, are "usually engaged in other occupations before, during, and
after the time that they serve as [neutrals] ... [and] purposely chosen from the same
trade or industry [because of their] specialized knowledge."' Moreover, their
prospect for future business depends on continued referrals-usually from the repeat
player. 9 ADR lacks comparable judicial procedural protections and standards for
53. Green Tree Fin. Servs. v. Randolph, 121 S. Ct. 513 (2000).
54. See, e.g., Sternlight, supra note 23, at 661 (arguing that the U.S. Supreme Court's
preference for arbitration has no legitimate basis in legislative history and that neither
economic nor other policy arguments support a policy allowing large companies to impose
possibly unfair arbitration clauses on ignorant consumers and employees).
55. See Ware, supra note 49, at 218. That a contract is adhesive is not alone grounds to
invalidate. Badie v. Bank of Am., 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273, 277 n.5 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
56. Bernstein, supra note 2, at 2172-75; Haagen, supra note 4, at 1049.
57. See supra note 14.
58. CODEOFET-ICSFORARBITRATORS INCOMMERCIALDISPUTESpmbl. (Am. Arbitration
Ass'n 1999), available athttp://www.adr.org/rulesethics/code.html [hereinafterARBrRAToRS'
ETmcs CODE].
59. A number of commercial contracts requiring ADR specify the ADR neutral or service
provider. The advance contractual appointment of an inside ADR neutral raises obvious
questions of potential bias. See Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165, 172, 176-77 (Cal.
1981) (severing as unconscionable for bias the selection provision of contract naming
defendant's agent as arbitrator and stating that adhesion contracts are generally enforceable
according to their terms, but must possess "'minimum levels of integrity' (quoting Hines v.
Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 571 (1976))). Although provisions that specify an
ADR service provider, such as the American Arbitration Association, are less susceptible to
challenge, some suggest this arrangement is similarly questionable. A number of ADR service
providers have entered into "exclusive contracts" with corporate entities for providing
arbitrators in disputes brought by their employees; thereby allowing the corporate employer to
unilaterally determine the pool of potential arbitrators. For example, JAMS/Endispute, a for-
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appellate review. The process is confidential, outside of public or judicial scrutiny,
and lacks enforcement mechanisms to address participant misconduct or abuse of the
process °
Because ADR use is largely unaccountable and the players unregulated, the
potential to exploit bargaining power or abuse the process is ripe, with seemingly
minimal consequences. The lack of meaningfil checks for "policing" participants'
behavior risks misconduct or abuse in the ADR process and undermines ADR's
legitimacy orpotential effectiveness. " ' Because ADR lacks the procedural protections
of a judicial forum, such as rights to a jury trial, discovery, appeal, and judicial
remedies for abusive conduct, the possibilities for unfairness cannot be overlooked.
B. Misconduct and Process-Abuse Scenarios in Compulsory ADR
What recourse does an individual have, for example, when the mediator or
arbitrator fails to disclose a conflict of interest, bias, or lack of competence; fails to
provide a party the opportunity to present its case; excludes the parties' lawyers from
the session; engages in abuse or intimidation of a party;, or unduly pressures a party
to accept specific terms?
The public perception of a mediator pressuring a weaker party in settlement was
at least raised by a news article announcing the mediated settlement in Mena v. City
of Denver.' The city had requested mediation to attempt to resolve the family's
action against the city for a police SWAT team no-knock raid made on the wrong
house in which Ismael Mena, a Mexican immigrant, was shot deadinhis own home.'
Obviously, mediation out of the public eye was preferable for the city to avoid further
adverse publicity. The news article reports that the former federal judge/mediator
"kept telling us [the family] the ultimate value of the case was between $200-500K
profit provider ofADR services, was recently in the news about its exclusive contract with MCI
to serve as its neutral in all cases where MCI requires mediation or arbitration. See Caroline
E. Mayer, MCI's Fine Art of Fine Print: Arbitration Requirement Is Buried in Obscure FCC
Filing, WASH POST, Dec. 14, 1999, at El, E6 (noting that MCI customers are bound to
arbitrate on the basis of arbitration rules inserted in FCC filings); John L. Guerra, MCIW's Bill
Arbitration Process Under Fire, BILLING WORLD (Feb. 1, 2000) (describing MCI's exclusive
contract for arbitration services with JAMS), at http://www.billingworld.com; see also How
Carriers Use Tariffs to Snare the Unsuspecting, TELECOM MANAGER'S VOICE REP., Jan. 17,
2000, at 1, LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File (stating that MCI's arbitration clause
requires disputants to pay $1,000 fee plus share of arbitrator's $350 hourly rate). Parties
opposing MCI questioned the genuine neutrality of a service provider with financial interests
in the corporation. See Mayer, supra, at E6; see also Floss v. Ryan's Family Steakhouses, Inc.,
211 F.3d 306, 315 (6th Cir. 2000) (acknowledging "potential for bias exists" where employer
has exclusive contract with for-profit ADR service, which determines the pool of potential
arbitrators, in disputes brought byemployees); Cole v. Bums Int'l See. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465,
1485 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (speculating that any tendency to "lean" in favor of an employer "would
be because the employer is a source of future arbitration business").
60. See Delgado et al., supra note 12, at 1368-74.
61. Haagen, supra note 4, at 1043-44, 1048.
62. See Bruce Finley, $400 Settles Mena Case: Webb Steps In to BrokerDeal in Fatal No-
KnockRaid, DENVER POST, Mar. 24, 2000, at IA, LEXIS, News Library, DPOST File.
63. Id.
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... and reminded us several times that he [the deceased] was really a potential felon
by illegally living in the country." Granted, the parties may have specifically
requested the mediator to "evaluate" the case so that they could more realistically
assess their positions. Yet here we had the mayor, the city of Denver's cadre of
attorneys, and the judge/mediator (whose fees were likely paid by the city) against a
solo practitioner and family who had sold their livestock to travel from Mexico to
Denver.' The mediator's apparent repeated statements to the family that they lacked
the resources to fight the city in federal court and that a jury would view the
deceased's case unfavorably because of his illegal immigrant status are disturbing.
While the family could have rejected the offer, the aura of authority and actions by
the mediator obviously influenced their decision. Because of the secrecy of most
ADR proceedings, we do not know if this type of mediator conduct is typical.
Nevertheless, is this the appropriate way to resolve civil rights claims?'
The conduct of parties and attorneys in ADR proceedings presents similar
concerns, such as when they, fail to attend or to participate in a scheduled ADR
session; repeatedly cancel or delay scheduling an ADR session or appointing a
neutral; show up without settlement authority or unprepared to discuss the law or
facts relevant to the case; fail to present evidence or key witnesses; fail to explain
their position or listen and respond to the other's contentions; secretly withhold
information or repeatedly refuse reasonable requests for information and discovery;
use ADR only for discovery purposes; continually delay the hearings; attempt to
influence the third-party neutral; or lie or present false evidence, badger, belittle, or
abuse the opposing party. Suppose a party brings a jury consultant to a mediation,
identifying her as a "business associate," for the obvious purpose to size up witnesses
for trial?'
Glaring examples of abuses in arbitration are found within the HMO industry,
which routinely requires consumers to submit malpractice and coverage claims to
arbitration but reportedly engages in dilatory and evasive conduct in the selection of
the arbitrator, disclosure of information, and the arbitral proceeding. The court in
Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc.6 found that, although Kaiser
Permanente's form arbitration contracts required mutual selection of an arbitrator
within sixty days, statistical evidence showed that Kaiser delayed selection in ninety-
nine percent of all medical malpractice actions to over two years. 9 InEngalla, Kaiser
repeatedly delayed its obligation to select an arbitrator until the plaintiff died, thus
reducing recoverable damages to nearly one-half.70
64. Id.
65. Id.; see also Kevin Flynn, No Knock Panel Won't Open Meetings, DENVER ROCKY
MTN. NEWS, Mar. 22, 2000, at 22A, LEXIS, News Library, RMTNEW File (noting federal
government's investigation of civil rights violations against Mena).
66. See, e.g., Delgado et al., supra note 12, at 1394-95 (asserting that members ofminority
and disadvantaged groups face a heightened risk of prejudice in ADR); Trina Grillo, The
Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545, 1559-64 (1991).
67. See Kovach, supra note 13, at 594 (describing a Texas mediation that may not be cited
due to confidentiality).
68. 938 P.2d 903 (Cal. 1997).
69. Id. at 912-13.
70. Id. at 914.
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Much commentary has focused on the impropriety of enforcing predispute
arbitration agreements or mandatoryADR adhesion contracts on unwitting consumers
and employees,"1 rather than on the conduct during the ADR process. Underlying
these objections to mandatory ADR is the concern that all parties may not be treated
fairly in the process or that their rights may not be adequately protected. Because of
the secrecy of private ADR proceedings and restricted judicial recourse, it is difficult
to determine exactly what happens once parties are inside an ADR process. In
Engalla, the plaintiffs submitted to the compulsoryprivate arbitration process, despite
their lack of bargaining power or true consent to the provision appearing in the
HMO's contracts.7 2 When the plaintiffs tried to use the process, designed and
administered by Kaiser, they encountered endless delay tactics. 3 Although the
California Supreme Court held that sufficient evidence indicated that Kaiser had
waived its contractual right to arbitration based upon its misconduct and dilatory
tactics during the arbitration,74 Kaiser effectively drew no judicial sanctions for its
misconduct. The Engallas were permitted to pursue their claim in court, but the
damage from Kaiser's arbitral misconduct had already been done.75
Engalla depicts a scenario likely to recur under the current widespread use of
mandatory ADR contracts in consumer or employment transactions. If an individual
consumer is contractually bound to submit a dispute to arbitration, but in that process
the opposing party continuously delays the proceeding or neutral selection process,
refuses reasonable discovery requests, or engages in a range of conduct just short of
fraud, what are the individual's options? The FAA permits judicial assistance to
compel arbitration,76 but the problem is that arbitration itself is not working. The
refusal to participate in an arbitration proceeding may be construed as a waiver of the
arbitration obligation, thus freeing the aggrieved party to sue in court, as in Engalla.
Yet a party is not assured that a court will deem misconduct to constitute a waiver.
In any event, waiver is inadequate to compensate for the lost time, expense, and
aggravation incurred in enduring a misused ADR process. Similar misconduct or
abuse ofprocess in amediation setting would also go unpenalized absent some ability
to draw attention to a participant's misconduct and to seek judicial relief.
IV. JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO ADR MISCONDUCT
The specific question raised is: what recourse does or should a party have for the
misconduct the bad faith, or the abuse of an ADR process by other participants, be
it the third-party neutral or opposing party and counsel? The following examines how
some courts and legislatures address participant bad faith or misconduct in the
traditional judicial setting, as well as in court-annexed ADR proceedings, by
imposition of a "good-faith-participation" requirement.
71. See, e.g., Sternlight, supra note 35.
72. Engalla, 938 P.2d at 909-10.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 922-24 (finding also sufficient evidence that HMO fraudulently induced patient
to agree to arbitration to permit rescission of contract).
75. Id. at 908.
76. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1994). A similar request for specific performance of an ADR agreement
may be sought under contract-law principles.
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A. Misconduct Sanctions in Civil Litigation
In a judicial setting, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorize courts to
impose sanctions against an attorney or party under Rule 11 for harassing and
frivolous conduct in pleadings or representations to the court; under Rule 37 for
misconduct in discovery;, and under Rule 16 for misconduct or bad faith in the
conduct of pretrial conferences and settlement negotiations.' Under 28 U.S.C. §
1927, a court can require "any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in
any court of the United States .... who so multiplies the proceedings in any case
unreasonably and vexatiously .... to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses,
and attorneys' fees reasonably incurredbecause of such conduct."8 Parties also have
the right to seek recusal of a judge for bias or conflicts of interest, or even a
mandamus prohibiting certain action by a judge, and have the right to appeal.7 9
B. Current (Inadequate) Recoursefor ADR
Abuse-FAA and Contract Defenses
Existing laws and regulatory mechanisms to address participant misconduct in an
ADR setting are inadequate. The current recourse under the FAA for arbitral or party
misconduct, bias, or fraud is that the award is "set aside"--and the parties return for
round two in the same system."0 Contractual defenses of fraud, duress, undue
77. FED. R. Civ. P.11 ("By presenting to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting
or later advocating) a pleading, written motion, or other paper, an attorney or unrepresented
party is certifying .... [that] it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to
harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.'); FED. R.
Civ. P. 37 (authorizing sanctions for failure to make disclosures, for false, evasive, incomplete
or misleading disclosures, or failure to participate in good faith in development of discovery
plan). Rule 16() authorizes sanctions
[i]f a party or party's attorney fails to obey a scheduling or pretrial order, or if no
appearance is made on behalf ofa party at a scheduling or pretrial conference, or
if a party or party's attorney is substantially unprepared to participate in the
conference, or if a party or party's attorneyfails to participate in good faith.
FED. R. CIV. P. 16(f) (emphasis added).
78. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1994).
79. See, e.g., In re Briggs, 217 F.3d 837, 837 (4th Cir. 2000).
80. The FAA permits a court to, in any of the following cases, vacate an arbitration award:
(1) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.
(2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either
of them.
(3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the
hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent
and material to the controversy;, or of any other misbehavior by which the rights
of any party have been prejudiced.
(4) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers ....
9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(l)-(4) (1994).
Backed bythe Supreme Court's preference for arbitration, courts narrowly interpret § 10.
See Sobel v. Hertz, Warner & Co., 469 F.2d 1211 (2d Cir. 1972) (holding that arbitrators are
not required to explain the reasons or findings underlying an award, even for purposes of the
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influence, and unconscionability may be asserted to void or mediated settlement
agreement" Vacatur is a small consolation where a party is out for attorney fees,
arbitrator or mediator fees, costs, and time, and yet must return to the same ADR
forum, with the lack of procedural safeguards and regulation, for a repeated attempt
to resolve the underlying claim. Merely having the outcome set aside does nothing to
compensate the aggrieved party for the costs, fees, time, and anguish incurred in
enduring an ADR proceeding tainted with bad faith or misconduct. Further, there is
no penalty to the offending party and the odds are really in their favor that their
misconduct, which may fall just short of fraud, duress, or unconscionability, will beat
down the other side.'
C. Good-Faith or Meaningful-Participation Requirements
in Court-Ordered ADR
To guard against abuse of court-annexed ADR programs, some courts and
legislatures have imposed requirements that parties participate "in good faith" or "in
a meaningful manner." 3 Some of these courts and legislatures have also adopted
limitedjudicial review under the FAA); Morrowv. Jersey Capital Mktg. Group, [ 1995 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,634, at 91,895 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (noting that courts
impose a strict standard under the FAA to vacate an arbitration award on the basis of fraud or
misconduct and that "[o]nly the most egregious error which adversely affects the rights of a
party constitutes 'misconduct in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the
controversy' warranting vacatur of an award" (quoting Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp. 654 F. Supp.
1487, 1512 (S.D.N.Y. 1987))).
81. See FDIC v. White, 76 F. Supp. 2d 736, 738 (N.D. Tex. 1999); Alan Kirtley, The
Mediation Privilege's Transition from Theory to Implementation: Designing a Mediation
Privilege Standard to Protect Mediation Participants, the Process and the Public Interest,
1995 J. DIsP. REsOL 1, 51; Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Informed Consent in Mediation: A
Guiding Principle for Truly Educated Decisionmaking, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 775, 807
(1999) (noting that standard contract defenses are available in mediation). Under § 10 of the
FAA, an arbitration award may be vacated where, inter alia, "the award was procured by
corruption, fraud, or undue means," or the arbitrator displayed "evident partiality or
corruption." 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(l)-(2) (1994).
82. See Kovach, supra note 13, at 593; see, e.g., Science Dev. Corp. v. Schonberger, 548
N.Y.S.2d 692, 693 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (recognizing that discovery of new evidence is
generally not grounds for vacatur of an arbitration award but remanding due to party's failure
to disclose critical evidence to the arbitrator); Kalgren v. Central Mut. Ins. Co., 418 N.Y.S.2d
1, 3 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979) (noting that party's lack of candor and failure to apprise arbitrator
of relevant payment information did not constitute fraud but did exhibit misconduct violating
good faith, warranting reexamination by the arbitrator).
83. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-5430(c)(4) (1992) (requiring "participat[ion] in good
faith in the mediation"); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 214.752 (repealed 1997) (requiring
good-faith effort to mediate in mandatory domestic mediation); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 583.27
subds. 1, 3 (West 2000) (requiring good-faith mediation of a farm mortgage dispute until
settlement or for up to sixty days, with authority in mediator to determine that a party is "not
participating in good faith"); ILL SuP. CT. R. 91(b) (requiring that all parties participate in
court-annexed arbitration hearing in good faith and in a meaningful manner and providing that
unanimous finding by the arbitral panel of bad faith be stated on the arbitration award); NEv.
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policies that require third-party neutrals to submit "reports" to judicial officials
concerning the parties' participation or that require the neutral's "evaluation" if the
parties do not reach agreements" Although few statutes or court orders mandating
good-faith participation specify all conduct that constitutes compliance, courts have
found violation of the good-faith requirement in conduct ranging from failure to
attend, failure to bring a client with full settlement authority, and failure to present
witnesses orrelevant evidence and factual information at an ADR session, to dilatory
tactics or a pattern of other conduct considered frivolous, obstructive, or abusive of
the process."5 Through its inherent authority or pursuant to legislation or court rules,
courts have imposed a variety of sanctions, including costs, attorneys fees, contempt,
denial of a request for a trial de novo, or dismissal for misconduct or bad faith in
court-ordered ADR proceedings.'
ARB. R. 22(A) ("The failure of a party or an attorney to either prosecute or defend a case in
good faith during the arbitration proceedings shall constitute a waiver of the right to a trial de
novo"); see also Bernstein, supra note 2, at 2181 n.41 (citing examples of federal district local
court rules requiring good-faith participation and providing for sanctions); Note, Mandatory
Mediation and Summary Jury Trial: GuidelinesforEnsuringFairandEffective Processes, 103
HARv. L. REv. 1086, 1096-97 (1990) (noting that most mandatory mediation statutes or rules
do not set forth participation requirements or specify how parties must behave).
84. See, e.g., Gilling v. E. Airlines, Inc., 680 F. Supp. 169, 171 (D.N.J. 1988) (giving
arbitrator determination of participation "in a meaningful manner"); Foxgate Homeowners'
Ass'n v. Bramalea Cal., Inc., 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 916, 918 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (accepting
mediator's report of defense counsel's obstructive bad-faith tactics at court-ordered mediation
session), review granted, 999 P.2d 666 (Cal. 2000); Employer's Consortium, Inc. v. Aaron,
698 N.E.2d 189, 190 (11. App. Ct. 1998) (accepting neutral's report of the parties' level of
participation in the ADR process).
85. See, e.g., Gilling, 680 F. Supp. at 170 (granting defendants' request for trial de novo
and imposing sanctions on defendants for defendants' failure to participate in meaningful
manner in court's compulsory arbitration program); New Eng. Merchs. Nat'l Bank v. Hughes,
556 F. Supp. 712, 714-15 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (holding that defendant's failure to appear at
mandatory court-annexed arbitration hearing without explanation precluded defendant from
demanding a trial de novo); Genovia v. Cassidy, 193 Cal. Rptr. 454,458 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983)
(upholding dismissal for "premeditated, intentional and purposeful course of action taken by
[plaintiff] and his counsel to seek an avenue of escape from a clearly mandated arbitration
procedure'); Wahle v. Medical Ctr. of Del., Inc., 559 A.2d 1228, 1233 (Del. 1989) (affirming
dismissal based on plaintiff's failure to complywith discoveryrequirements imposed by state's
medical malpractice arbitration procedures where plaintiff simply consented to default in
arbitration and then filed ademand fortrial denovo);Aaron, 698 N.E.2d at 190 (affirming trial
court's refusal to allow plaintiffs to reject arbitrator's award and seek de novo trial where the
arbitrators, in the mandatory court-ordered arbitration, found plaintiffs had not participated in
good faith and in a meaningful way due to plaintiff counsel's "failure to present any
evidence'); State Farm Ins. Co. v. Gebbie, 681 N.E.2d 595, 597 (111. App. Ct. 1997) (holding
defendant's failure to appear at arbitration was failure to participate in good faith and
upholding order denying defendant's rejection of arbitration award); Kalgrenv. Cent. Mut. Ins.
Co., 418 N.Y.S.2d 1,3 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979) (stating that party has good-faith obligation and
affirmative duty to inform arbitrator of relevant payment information); Garcia v. Mireles, 14
S.W.3d 839,842-43 (Tex. App. 2000) (holding court has inherent power to dismiss plaintiff's
suit as sanction for failure of party and her attorney to appear at court-ordered mediation).
86. See supra note 20. As a disincentive to requesting a trial de novo, some court-annexed
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Many cases in which courts have imposed sanctions arose out of the sanctioned
party's failure to abide by explicit conduct instructions in a court's ADR referral
order. Thus, in Nick v. Morgan's Foods, Inc., ' where the defendant employer
deliberately failed to provide a position memorandum to the mediator or to send a
representative with authority to settle as required by the court's mediation referral
order, the court sanctioned the employer for failure to participate in good faith.8" The
court emphasized that the absence of good faith was evidenced by the employer's
actual conduct at the mediation and calculated decision to disregard the court's
referral order, not by the parties' failure to reach settlement or by the hypothetical
result that a defendant's verdict at trial would vindicate the employer's failure to
participate in ADR. 89
In other instances conduct has been deemed to violate statutory or court rules
requiring good-faith participation in a court-annexed ADR proceeding. For example,
the Illinois Supreme Court adopted Rule 91(b), requiring good-faith participation at
mandatory arbitration hearings.9 This rule provides, in part:
(b) Good-Faith Participation. All parties to the arbitration hearings must
participate in the hearing in good faith and in a meaningful manner. Ifa panel of
arbitrators unanimously finds that a party has failed to participate in the hearing
in good faith and in a meaningful manner, the panel's finding and factual basis
therefor shall be stated on the award. Such award shall beprimafacie evidence
rules require the party requesting a new trial pay the other side's costs and fees in the new trial
if the requesting party failed to improve its position in the new trial. I ROGERS & MCEWEN,
supra note 10, § 7:05.
87. 99 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1057 (E.D. Mo. 2000). The order referring parties to mediation
required the parties to submit a confidential memorandumto the neutral, summarizing disputed
issues and positions relative to liability and damages and identifying the corporate
representative. The order also provided that all parties and counsel having full authority to
settle "shall attend all mediation conferences and participate in good faith." Id. at 1058
(emphasis omitted). The employer did not provide the memorandum to the neutral and failed
to send a representative with authority to settle. Id. At the ADR conference, the employee made
two offers, both of which the employer rejected without any counteroffer. Id. Thereafter,
plaintiff sought sanctions for costs and fees against the employer for failure to participate in
good faith in the court-ordered ADR process. Id. The employer conceded that it did not comply
with the referral order because to do so would have been "a waste of time" yet contended that
the court lacked authority to impose sanctions to enforce an ADR referral order. Id. at 1059.
The court based its authority to order and enforce good faith on Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 16 and its inherent authority to impose sanctions to control litigation and to preserve
the integrity of the judicial process. Id. at 1060-61.
88. Id. at 1058-59.
89. Id. at 1061. The court had learned about the details ofthe mediation through the parties
(and not the mediator) in two separate hearings in response to the court's show cause order and
the plaintiff's motion for sanctions. E-mail from Rodney Sippel, Judge, Eastern District Court
of Missouri, to Maureen Weston, Associate Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma College
of Law (Mar. 6, 2001) (on file with author) (clarifying "that the mediator did not breach the
confidentiality of the mediation").
90. See, e.g., Aaron, 698 N.E.2d at 190 ("The arbitrators found the plaintiffs had not
participated in good faith and in a meaningful way pursuant to [Illinois] Supreme Court Rule
91(b).').
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that the party failed to participate in the arbitration hearing in good faith and in
a meaningful manner and a court, when presented with a petition for sanctions or
remedy therefor, may order sanctions as provided in Rule 219(c), including, but
not limited to, an order debarring that party from rejecting the award, and costs
and attorney fees incurred for the arbitration hearing and in the prosecution of the
petition for sanctions, against that party."
Based on Rule 91(b), the court in Employer's Consortium, Inc. v. Aaron' affirmed
the trial court's refusal to allow plaintiffs to reject an arbitration award and seek a
trial de novo.93 Plaintiffs' case had been referred to mandatory court-ordered
arbitration, and the arbitrators found that the plaintiffs had not participated in good
faith and in a meaningful way due to the plaintiffs' counsel's "failure to present any
evidence." 4 The attorney had made only a brief opening statement and submitted a
copy of the unverified complaint with attached exhibits to the arbitrators but declined
to present any witnesses."
The Aaron court noted that "committee comments to [Rule 91(b)] indicate the
intent of the rule was to prevent parties and lawyers from abusing the arbitration
process by refusing to participate."'96 This purpose is defeated whether a party's
conduct is "the result of lack of preparation or an intentional disregard for the
process.:' The court stated:
It is essential to the integrity of the mandatory arbitration process that the parties
proceed at the arbitration hearing in good faith and subject their claims to the sort
ofadversarial testing that would be expected at trial. The trial court has discretion
to enforce supreme court rules and impose sanctions on the parties as appropriate
and necessary to promote the unimpeded flow of litigation and maintain the
integrity of our court system.
Even without a court rule or statutoryprovision requiring good faith or meaningful
participation in a court-adnexed ADR process, courts have inferred a good-faith-
participation requirement and imposed sanctions pursuant either to their general
authority under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 (or state counterparts) or inherent
authority to control the litigation process." Findings of bad-faith conduct have been
91. ILL Sup. CT. R. 91(b).
92. 698 N.E.2d 189 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998); see also Hill v. Joseph Behr & Sons, Inc., 688
N.E.2d 1226, 1229 (111. App. Ct. 1997) (stating that arbitration panel need not find bad faith
in order for trial court to deny party from rejecting arbitration award); cf. Webber v.
Bednarczyk, 678 N.E.2d 701, 704 (l1. App. CL 1997) (holding that arbitration panel is in best
position to judge parties' participation in arbitration unless a transcript is provided).
93. Aaron, 698 N.E.2d at 193.
94. Id. at 190.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 191.
97. Id. at 193.
98. Id. The court also noted that the party subject to sanctions under the rule has "the
burden of demonstrating that their actions were reasonable or justified by extenuating
circumstances." Id. at 192.
99. See Nick v. Morgan Foods, Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1059-60 (E.D. Mo. 2000);
Garcia v. Mireles, 14 S.W.3d 839,843 (Tex. App. 2000) (holding court has inherent power to
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based on a party's conduct deemed to undermine the objectives of the court-ordered
ADR process.'"
Gilling v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.'0o spoke to the concern about parties simply"going
through the motions" of a court-ordered ADR proceeding while intending to
disregard the process and seek a trial de novo. ° In the court-ordered arbitration, the
defendant failed to appear. Defendant's lawyer failed to bring witnesses, merely
summarized evidence, and told the arbitrator in response to a question on damages,
"Do what you want, or, we don't care what you do, we won't pay it anyway."'0 3 The
local rule required participation in "a meaningful manner," as determined by the
arbitrator.'" Based on the arbitrator's report of the defense's conduct, the court ruled
that such conduct frustrates the rule's aim to produce nonbinding awards that would
indicate likely trial results, stating:
In order for the compulsory arbitration program to function properly, it is
essential that the parties participate in a meaningful manner. This is particularly
so in a case such as this in which one of the parties is a substantial corporation
and the other party is one or more individuals. The purposes of the arbitration
program are to provide the parties with a quick and inexpensive means of
resolving their dispute while, at the same time, reducing the court's caseload.
These purposes are thwarted when a party to the arbitration enters into it with
the intention from the outset of rejecting its outcome and demanding a trial de
novo.... Explicit in this court's arbitration program is the need for the parties
to participate in good faith. Failure to do so warrants appropriate sanctions bythe
court.
05
The Gilling court sanctioned the defendant for failure to participate meaningfully in
the arbitration but granted defendant's motion for trial de novo,'" thus avoiding the
constitutionality of the more drastic sanction denying a trial de novo based on
conduct in a court-ordered ADR proceeding. Some courts refuse to deny a trial
request based on misconduct in an ADR proceeding and consider that the
constitutionality of court-ordered ADR programs rests on the right to go to trial. 7
dismiss plaintiff's suit as sanction for party's failure to appear at court-ordered mediation); I
ROGERS & MCEWEN, supra note 10, at § 7:06, at 40, 42-48; English, supra note 20, § 2.
100. English, supra note 20, §§ 15-21.
101. 680 F. Supp. 169 (D.N.J. 1988).
102. Id. at 170.
103. Id. at 169.
104. The local rule placed the determination of meaningful participation in the hands and
discretion of the arbitrator, yet required court sanctions. Id.; see also Todd Shipyards Corp. v.
Cunard Line Ltd., 735 F. Supp. 1463, 1468 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (stating facts regarding
underlying bad-faith conduct); Wertheimer v. Acret, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 423, 424 (Cal. Ct. App.
1992) (affirming sanctions against plaintiffs for failing to participate in judicial arbitration in
good faith by deliberately failing to produce expert witness, even though California arbitration
rules had no explicit good-faith requirement).
105. Giling, 680 F. Supp. at 169-70.
106. Id. at 171.
107. Note, supra note 83, at 1097 n.85; see, e.g., Lyons v. Wickhorst, 727 P.2d 1019, 1023
(Cal. 1986) (holding that the court was not authorized to dismiss plaintiff's request for de novo
trial based on plaintiff's failure to present any evidence at the mandatory arbitration hearing);
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Other courts, however, view the right to trial as conditional upon aparty's good-faith
participation in pretrial and court-mandated ADR proceedings."°5
The rationale underlying the good-faith requirement is that the purpose of the ADR
program and potential for parties to achieve the benefits of ADR can only be
effectuated if the parties engage in the process in a meaningfil manner."° Without
such a requirement, many litigants and attorneys maytreat court-ordered ADR as one
Schulz v. Nienhuis, 448 N.W.2d 655, 656 (Wis. 1989) (holding that "claimant's failure to
participate in a mediation session within the statutory mediation period" did not require
dismissal but court could determine other remedy); cf Casino Props., Inc. v. Andrews, 911
P.2d 1181, 1183 (Nev. 1996) (holding that defendant's untimely responses to discovery
requests that impeded preparation constituted failure to defend nonbinding arbitration in good
faith and affirming trial court's refusal to grant a trial de novo). But see Chamberland v.
Labarbera, 877 P.2d 523, 524 (Nev, 1994) (ruling that defendant's failure to conduct pre-
arbitration discovery did not constitute lack of good faith and reversing denial of request for
trial de novo); San-Dar Assocs. v. Adams, 643 N.Y.S.2d 880, 881 (N.Y. App. Term 1996)
(ruling that party who did not appear, yet whose attorney actively participated at nonbinding
arbitration hearing, was not "in default" and thus entitled to a trial de novo); Main St. Asset
Corp. v. Cunningham, 778 P.2d 1003, 1004 (Or. Ct. App. 1989) (reversing order denying trial
de novo to defendant who failed to attend the nonbinding arbitration hearing and whose
attorney presented no evidence at the arbitration hearing).
108. See, e.g., New Eng. Merchs. Nat'l Bank v. Hughes, 556 F. Supp. 712,715 (E.D. Pa.
1983) (denying request for trial de novo where defendant offered no excuse for failing to
appear at arbitration hearing and stating that the "goals of the arbitration program and the
authority of this court would be seriously undermined if a defendant were permitted to refuse
to attend an arbitration hearing and then demand trial de novo"); Genovia v. Cassidy, 193 Cal.
Rptr. 454 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (affirming dismissal where plaintiff failed to appear at a court-
ordered mandatory arbitration and plaintiff's counsel had asked the arbitrator for a "verdict"
in favor of the defendant so that he could immediately ask for a trial de novo; the court found
such conduct a substantially uncontroverted instance of premeditated, intentional, and
purposeful conduct to avoid the mandatory arbitration procedure);-Wahle v. Med. Ctr. of Del.,
Inc., 559 A.2d 1228, 1233 (Del. 1989) (affirming dismissal based on plaintiff's failure to
comply with discovery requirements imposed by state's medical malpractice arbitration
procedures where plaintiff simply consented to default in arbitration and then filed a demand
for trial de novo); Honeywell Prot. Servs. v. Tandem Telecomrm, Inc., 495 N.Y.S.2d 130, 131
(N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1985) (upholding arbitrator's dismissal of plaintiff's case based on plaintiff's
failure to appear at court-ordered arbitration session and where its counsel, though in
attendance, presented no evidence, but permitting plaintiff's request for trial de novo only on
condition that plaintiff attest it would present no evidence at trial that it had not already
produced at arbitration); Luxenberg v. Marshall, 835 S.W.2d 136, 141 (Tex. App. 1992)
(upholding sanction striking a party's pleadings for bad faith due to the party's history of
discovery abuse and violation of pretrial orders, including the failure to participate in a court-
ordered mediation).
109. See Kovach, supra note 13, at 609, 618 (advocating a mediation-in-good-faith
requirement be imposed on attorney-advocates in mediation); Tony Biller, Comment, Good
Faith Mediation: Improving Efficiency, Cost, and Satisfaction in North Carolina's Pre-trial
Process, 18 CAMPBELLL.REV.281,282 (1996) (asserting that "[c]reating and enforcing a duty




other hurdle in the path toward trial and simplyawaste of time and money.'10 Despite
these intentions, the requirement has generated significant controversy, raising the
question whether such a participation requirement hurts more than it helps."'
Sanctioned parties have challenged courts' imposition of sanctions based on the
determination that a party has not acted in good faith in a court-annexed ADR
proceeding.'
2
D. Objections to Good-Faith-Participation Requirements
Imposing participation requirements in a court-annexed ADR program creates
tension with other policies designed to ensure confidentiality, third-party neutrality,
due process, and party autonomy. For example, judicial determinations of bad-faith
conduct may involve disclosures of the underlying ADR proceeding that seemingly
infringe upon confidentiality privileges."' Other significant objections to sanctions
for violation of a good-faith-participation requirement are that client attendance
requirements impose undue burdens;" 4 that requiring parties to present evidence in
mandatorynonbinding ADR proceedings infringes upon workproduct privileges and
forces disclosures of trial strategy;" 5 and that financial disincentives and sanctions
(particularly dismissal or contempt) for participation in a nonbinding process
constitute coercion and deny a party the right to trial."6 Finally, others contend that
110. Kovach, supra note 13, at 594-96.
111. See, e.g., Wayne D. Brazil, Continuingthe Conversation about the Current Status and
the Future ofADR: A View from the Courts, 2000 J. DIsP. RESoL. 11, 31-33 (questioning the
advisability of a good-faith requirement because of its impact on confidentiality in mediation).
112. See infra Part IV.D.
113. See, e.g., infra Part V.F.
114. Cf. G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648, 654 (7th Cir. 1989)
(rejecting arguments that federal district court order requiring represented parties to attend
pretrial settlement conferences posed undue burden and exceeded court's pretrial conference
authority and explaining rationale for requiring party attendance); Physicians Protective Trust
Fund v. Overman, 636 So. 2d 827, 828-29 (Fla. Dist. Ct App. 1994) (approving of trial court
order compelling entire board of trustees of insurance company to attend mediation session as
sanction for failing to originally send representative with full settlement authority).
115. See Strandell v. Jackson County, Ill., 838 F.2d 884, 888 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding trial
court exceeded its Rule 16 authority in holding lawyer in contempt for refusing to participate
in court-ordered nonbinding summaryjury trial and ruling such compelled participation could
upset a "carefully-crafted balance between the needs for pretrial disclosure and party
confidentiality" in the discovery and work product privilege rules); cf. Fed. Reserve Bank v.
Carey-Can., Inc., 123 F.R.D. 603, 606-07 (D. Minn. 1988) (holding trial court has power and
discretion to compel attendance and participation in nonbinding sunimaryjury trial and to close
proceedings to the public).
116. 1 ROGERS &MCEWEN, supra note 10, § 7:05, at 27 (noting the recommendation of the
Society for Professionals in Dispute Resolution that "'[c]oercion to settle in the form of reports
to the trier of fact and of financial disincentives to trial should not be used in connection with
mandatory mediation' (quoting Soc'Y OF PROF'LS IN DISPUTE RESOLUTION, MANDATED
PARTICIPATION AND SETTLEMENT COERCION: DISPUTE RESOLUTION AS IT RELATES TO THE
COURTS recommendation 3 (1991))).
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a good-faith standard is vague and does not define compliance.'1 7
A recent case illustrating some practical and policy difficulties with enforcing a
good-faith-participation requirement is Foxgate Homeowners' Ass'n v. Bramalea
California, Inc."' InFoxgate, the defendants and their attorney failed to bring expert
witnesses to a court-ordered mediation session specifically convened to have experts
onboth sides interact on construction defect issues. 9 At the mediation, the plaintiff's
lawyer appeared with nine expert witnesses while defense counsel showed up late,
alone, and with no experts. 2 ° After a few hours, the sessions were canceled due to
the absence of defense experts. 2 ' The mediator later filed a report to the court
reconmending that defendants be sanctioned for their conduct, recounting defense
counsel's conduct at the mediation session and stating that the attorney "has spent the
vast majority of his time trying to derail the mediations ... ."" The mediator
reported that "[a]s a result of [defense counsel's] obstructive bad faith tactics, the
remainder of the mediation sessions were canceled at a substantial cost to all
parties."'" Based upon the defense counsel's conduct at the mediation session and
the mediator's report to the court of defendant's bad-faith conduct, the trial court
imposed sanctions exceeding $30,000 against the defendant."2'
The appellate court rejected defendant's argument that the trial court's reliance on
the mediator's report, along with evidence of what happened during the mediation
session, violated state statutory mediation-confidentiality rules that preclude
admissibility of mediator reports and evidence of conduct occurring in a mediation
proceeding.'" Although the court reversed and remanded only for the trial court to
prepare a written order supporting sanctions as required by a local procedural rule,
it held that portions of the mediator's report about sanctionable conduct along with
evidence of statements made during the mediation relating to that conduct, could be
117. See id. § 7.06, at 27-28; Sherman, supra note 5, at 2092; David S. Winston, Note,
Participation Standards in Mandatory Mediation Statutes: "You Can Lead a Horse to Water
.. ", 11 Omo ST. J. ONDISP. RESOL 187, 193 (1996).
118. 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 916 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000), review granted, 999 P.2d 666 (Cal. 2000).
119. Id. at 920. The court's case management order ("CMQ") authorized the mediator to
make any orders governing the attendance ofparties at mediation conferences and provided that
"[a]ll parties will make every best effort to cooperate in the mediation process." Id. at 919.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 920.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 922-23.
125. Id. at 928-29. The appellate court avoided an interesting objection raised by the
defendants in the trial court, that the order to present their expert witnesses and disclose their
findings at an ADR session violated the attorney work product rule, and held that the argument
was raised only in passing, without discussion or citation to authority and thus waived. Id. at
924 n.8. The objection raises an intriguing question of whether a mediator, even pursuant to
court authorization, can order parties to bring experts or otherwise present work-product-
related evidence to a nonbinding court-mandated ADR proceeding. See Strandell v. Jackson
County, Ill., 838 F.2d 884, 888 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding trial court lacked authority to require
participation in court-ordered nonbinding summary jury trial where such participation was
inconsistent with a "carefully-crafted balance between the needs for pretrial disclosure and
party confidentiality" in the discovery and work product privilege rules).
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considered when ruling on a sanctions motion. 26
The Foxgate court acknowledged that statutory confidentiality privileges are
essential and enable party disclosures or concessions necessary to settlement in
mediation without fear that these statements will later be used in litigation.'" Equally
important is
the meaningful, goodfaithparticipation ofthe parties and their lawyers. Without
that, there will be few if any confidential statements to protect. These
[confidentiality] evidentiary privileges were enacted to promote and encourage
mediation. We do not believe the Legislature intended them as an immunity from
sanctions, shielding parties to court-ordered mediation who disobey valid orders
governing their participation in the mediation process, thereby intentionally
thwarting the process to pursue other litigation tactics.'m
The court ultimately cautioned that the confidentiality exception to report bad-faith
conduct in an ADR proceeding is narrow and that "only such information as is
reasonably necessary should be put before the court," and that "the report should be
no more than a strictly neutral account of the conduct and statements being reported,
along with such other information as required to place those matters in context.""'
Nonetheless, the court stated that the statutory confidentiality provisions were not
intended to prevent a mediator from reporting to the court that counsel or a party had
unilaterally and without notice violated the court's order to mediate in good faith or
126. Foxgate, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 928.
127. Id.
128. Id. (emphasis added). The court also noted, "[W]e are not the first court to hold that
the plain language of the mediation confidentiality privileges must sometimes yield to other
competing interests," and cited a case where aminor criminal defendant's "constitutional right
to confront and cross-examine witnesses took precedence, permitting a mediator to be called
to impeach a witness with statements the witness made during mediation." Id. at 928 n. 14. The
Foxgate court also posited:
What if a party to a particularly fractious and emotional dispute attacked or
threatened an opposing party or counsel during a mediation session? Should those
parties and the mediator be prevented by the mediation confidentiality privileges
from alerting the trial court to such conduct? We think not....
[Tihe court would have no way of learning that its orders had been disobeyed
or that some serious misconduct occurred which warrants judicial oversight, the
court would be stripped of its inherent power to police and control its own
processes.
Id. at 928-29.
129. Id. at 929 (advising trial courtto disregard portions ofimediator's report that contained
extraneous information such as recommendations, conclusions, or characterizations of conduct
or statements). The court stated that the provision preventing mediator reports focuses
on preventing coercion.... [A] mediator should not be able to influence the
result of a mediation or adjudication by reporting or threatening to report to the
decisionmaker on the merits of the dispute or reasons why mediation failed to
resolve it. Similarly, a mediator should not have authority to resolve or decide the
mediated dispute, and should not have any function for the adjudicating tribunal
with regard to the dispute, except as a non-decision making neutral.
Id. at 928 (quoting CAL. EVil. CODE § 1121 (West Supp. 1999)).
[Vol. 76:591
CHECKS ON CONDUCT IN COMPULSORYADR
to preclude a court from considering either the mediator's report or evidence of such
conduct when ruling on a sanctions motion. 30 As the court noted, "[ilf the mediator
or an aggrieved party can not tell the court about another party's sanctionable
conduct, it is hard to imagine who else would do so. 13
By contrast, other courts hold that they are either without authority to order parties
to participate in good faith in court-mandated ADR and refuse to consider reports of
ADR misconduct on grounds of confidentiality, or simply decline on principle to
interfere with the ADR process absent egregious conduct 32 Hill v. Imperial
Savings33 declined to impose sanctions on a party who attended a mediation without
full settlement authority absent grounds to award sanctions under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 11. The court stated:
Absent exceptional or egregious circumstances, this Court is unwilling to
interfere with the mediation process because not only would this consume the
Court's time but it would also subject the process to judicial review, thus placing
a damper upon the likelihood for frank, open negotiations needed for future
successful mediations."
134
Similarly, Strandellv. Jackson County'35 vacated a contempt citation againstalawyer
who refused to participate in a court-mandated summaryjury trial on grounds that the
order exceeded the court's pretrial conference authority and that the plaintiffs
required participation would "affect seriously the well-established rules concerning
discovery and work-product privilege."'36 The Iowa Supreme Court in Graham v.
130. The court's decision, on certiorari to the California Supreme Court, is controversial for
its willingness to consider mediation reports and evidence of conduct in a mediation in the face
of statutory confidentiality provisions. Critics of Foxgate say that it creates a vague and
unworkable standard for confidentiality by allowing consideration of mediator reports in a
sanctions case. See Justin Kelly, LA County Bar to Join Effort to Overturn Foxgate Ruling, at
http://www.adrworld.com (Oct. 13, 2000).
131. Foxgate, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 928; see supra note 125.
132. See, e.g., Willis v. McGraw, 177 F.R.D. 632, 633 (S.D. W. Va. 1998) (refusing to
involve the court "under any circumstances in sorting out disagreements amongst the parties
emanating from the mediation process"); Masseyv. Beagle, 754 So. 2d 146,147 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2000) (noting that Florida Rules of Civil Procedure do not permit a court to sanction a
nonparty for failure to participate in mediation in good faith); Dep't of Transp. v. City of
Atlanta, 380 S.E.2d 265, 268 (Ga. 1989) (holding "a trial court [has the authority to] refer
parties to mediation," but the order to engage in mediation in good faith would exceed the
court's authority if construed as justifying contempt penalties if the mediation failed).
133. 852 F. Supp. 1354 (W.D. Tex. 1992).
134. Hill v. Imperial Say., 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22185, at *74 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 24,1992)
(unpublished order); see also Tex. Parks & Wildlife Dep'tv. Davis, 988 S.W.2d 370,375 (Tex.
App. 1999) (ruling that state mandatory mediation statute required attendance but not that
parties negotiate in good faith or settle their dispute and that confidentiality statute required
that communications and records made during the mediation precluded disclosure of
negotiations to the trial court); cf. Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. Pirtle, 977 S.W.2d 657,658 (Tex.
App. 1998) (affirming sanctions against party who attended mediation but refused to
participate).
135. 838 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1987).
136. Id. at 888; see also In re NLO, Inc., 5 F.3d 154, 156 (6th Cir. 1993) (ruling district
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Baker 37 narrowly interpreted the "participation" requirement in farmer-lender
mandatory mediation legislation to require only party attendance but not good-faith
participation.' Although the attorney's conduct was "hostile to the [debtors], the
mediator, and the mediation process" and the party's behavior at the session "ranged
between acrimony and truculency" and "precluded any beneficial result to the parties
from the mediation process," no sanctions were levied. 39 Although recognizing that
resistant parties might thwart the purposes ofimediation, Graham stated that a narrow
interpretation of the statute's "participation" requirement is consistent with the
legislature's view of mediation as an advisory process."
V. LEGAL THEORIES TO REDRESS BAD FAITH AND PARTICIPANT
MISCONDUCT IN PRIVATE ADR
In court-annexed mandatory ADR, a good-faith requirement by court or legislative
rule, or simply the court's continuing jurisdiction, provides a minimal safeguard
against bad-faith and abusive conduct Although some courts may be reluctant to
interfere with or inquire into ADR proceedings, and although confidentiality
privileges may limit the extent of judicial inquiry, an aggrieved party in court-
annexed ADR generally retains the right to a trial and the option to bring claims of
bad faith to the court's attention. In private contractual ADR, similar protection and
recourse are lacking though the concern for process abuse is more compelling
because the process is entirely outside the auspices of the judicial system. With the
focus on contractual ADR,'4 the following demonstrates that rights and obligations
of good-faith participation exist as a matter of contract law. Thus, misconduct and
process abuse in private ADR should be disclosed and penalized. Extreme and
egregious cases of bad-faith misconduct in ADR may also give rise to independent
tort liability. Having identified the good-faith-participation obligation, this section
also examines how such a duty may be defined, measured, and enforced while
considering policies according ADR confidentiality.
court lacked authorityto mandate participation in time-consuming and expensive summaryjury
trials).
137. 447 N.W.2d 397 (Iowa 1989).
138. Id. at 400-01.
139. Id. at 398,401.
140. Id. at 400-01 (interpreting mediation statutory requirement of "participate"); see also
I ROGERS & MCEWEN, supra note 10, § 7:06, at 29-30.
141. Parties may seek judicial assistance to enforce agreements to submit disputes to ADR
but not for continued oversight during that process. Under the FAA a party can petition to
compel arbitration and can raise contractual defenses to avoid enforcement of a compulsory
agreement to arbitrate or to avoid enforcement of an arbitral award. 9 U.S.C. §§ 2, 4 (1994).
Under contract law, a party may also seek specific performance of a private contractual
agreement to submit disputes to ADR. Boutwell v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 254 Cal. Rptr.
173, 174 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that "[i]n the arbitration context, a plaintiff may
petition the superior court to assist her in expediting the proceedings by moving to appoint a
neutral arbitrator, moving to set an arbitration date, moving to strike a defendant's answer, or
entering a defendant's default").
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A. Considering Common-Law Good-Faith Duties and Bad-Faith
Liability in Private ADR
Legislation and rules requiring good-faith participation generally pertain only to
court-annexed ADRprograms. However, comparable duties to participate in aprivate
ADR proceeding in good faith and redress for ADR misconduct also exist under the
common law. For example, both the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") and
Restatement (Second) of Contracts recognize a duty of good faith and fair dealing in
the performance of a contract." Although the duty does not generally extend to
precontractual negotiations, 43 the duty applies to contractual relationships. Where
disputing parties are bound by contract to resolve disputes by private ADR, the
requisite contractual relationship exists to find, as a matter of contract law, that the
parties are subject to an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing to participate
in the ADR process."
Redress against misconduct or abuse of a private ADR procedure may also be
available under other legal theories. For example, breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing theoretically gives rise to an action in tort for bad-faith
142. See U.C.C. § 1-203 (2000); id. § 2-103(l)(b) (defining "good faith" as consisting of
"honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the
trade"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. c (1981) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT] (stating that "[e]very contract imposes upon each partya dutyof good faith and
fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement"). The Restatement measures good faith
under an objective standard. Thomas B. Romer, Comment, "Negotiate in Good Faith as to
What?" An Analysis of the Good Faith Negotiation Clause of the Telecommunications Act of
1996, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 257, 287-88 (1998); see also Mark Gergen, A Cautionary Tale
About Contractual GoodFaith in Texas, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1235 (1994); Richard E. Speidel, The
"Duty" of Good Faith in Contract Performance and Enforcement, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 537
(1996).
143. U.C.C. § 1-203 applies the duty to existing contractual relationships but not to
precontractual negotiations of arm's-length transactions. Failed negotiation liability has been
actionable under other theories, such as (1) unjust enrichment, (2) misappropriation of ideas
learned during the failed negotiations, (3) misrepresentations or specific promises made in
precontractual negotiations, or (4) the existence of a specific duty or agreement to negotiate in
good faith. E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 3.26a (2d ed. 1998); see
also Hill v. Waxberg, 237 F.2d 936 (9th Cir. 1956) (affirming liability for misappropriation
of ideas and design plans disclosed during negotiations); Itek Corp. v. Chicago Aerial Indus.,
248 A.2d 625, 629-30 (Del. 1968) (holding that letter of intent obligated each side to attempt
in good faith to reach a final agreement); Romer, supra note 142, at 283-85 (noting the most
common reason for excluding precontractual negotiations from a good-faith duty is the
"concern that limiting the freedom of negotiation might discourage parties from entering
negotiations"). The exception for precontractual negotiations does not apply where disputing
parties are already bound by contract to resolve disputes in an ADR proceeding.
144. STEVEN J. BURTON & ERIC G. ANDERSON, CONTRACTUAL GOOD FArrH: FORMATION,
PERFORMANCE, BREACi-, ENFORCEMENT §§ 2.1, 3.2.3 (1995) (noting independent cause of
action for breach of implied covenant of good faith is generally available in all U.S.
jurisdictions); cf. Chaykin, supra note 24, at 749-50 (stating that aparty's contractual dutywith
the arbitrator/mediator also gives rise to implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, with the
nature of the neutral's duty to be fair, unbiased, trustworthy, competent, and diligent).
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breach, with potential recovery for tortlike damages. 4 As a general matter, courts
have limited bad-faith actions to insurance cases due to the special relationship
(characterized by elements of adhesion, public interest, and fiduciary responsibility)
between the insurer and insured." Interestingly, the tort claim arising out of the
contractual implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing was created because
contract damages were an inadequate deterrent to insurer misconduct in settlement
situations. 47 Arguably, similar concerns are at stake (e.g., adhesion, public interest,
waiver ofjury trial, and due process protections) when more powerful parties impose
and abuse private compulsory ADR procedures. In cases of egregious misconduct or
abuse of a private compulsory ADR proceeding, a bad-faith claim may be
warranted. 4 ' Recovery for mental anguish and punitive damages may also be
available where egregious misconduct in an ADR process rises to the level of an
independent tort, such as fraud or intentional infliction of emotional distress."
145. The tort of bad-faith breach of contract, with the availability of punitive damages,
emotional distress, and attorney fees, was first recognized by the California Supreme Court "as
a means of imposing liability on insurers that refused to accept reasonable settlements in such
cases." FARNSWORTH, supra note 143, § 12.8, at 565; see also Best Place, Inc. v. Penn Am Ins.
Co., 920 P.2d 334 (Haw. 1996) (reviewing bad-faith cases and noting that the breach of duty
of good faith and fair dealing in insurance cases "gives rise to an independent tort cause of
action"); Michael H. Cohen, Comment, Reconstructing Breach of the Implied Covenant of
Good Faith and Fair Dealing as a Tort, 73 CAL. L. REv. 1291, 1292 n.9 (1985) (noting that
outrageous misconduct may be tortious even where parties have a contractual relationship).
146. FARNSWORTH, supra note 143, § 12.8, at 564-70. Although courts have been reluctant
to extend the bad-faith tort to noninsurance contexts-such as employment
relationships-absent a showing of a special relationship of trust and reliance or an
independent tort for which punitive damages would be available, "[r]ejection of the tort of bad
faith breach does not ... imply rejection of the implied covenant of good faith." Id.
147. Id. at 564-65. In the 1980s, a few courts attempted to extend the bad-faith tort to cases
in the noninsurance context. However, the approach has been rejected by most courts, limiting
the tort to insurance cases due to the unique relationship between the insurer and insured. Id.
at 566-69.
148. Attempts to extend the bad-faith claim to noninsurance cases has met strong judicial
resistance, but the rationale appears to be based more on the pragmatic concern against
expanding litigation than on theoretical legal distinctions with insurances cases (where a
separate breach of fiduciary claim is available). The Delaware Supreme Court refused to extend
bad-faith breach to an employment relationship, making the dubious distinction that an insurer
has a "strong incentive to conserve its financial resources," whereas an employer has an
incentive to maintain a reputation and to retain and motivate employees. E.I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co. v. Pressman, 679 A.2d 436,447 (Del. 1996); see also Foley v. Interactive Data
Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 389-401 (Cal. 1988) (rejecting application of bad-faith breach to
employment cases).
149. A participant who purposely causes emotional distress may be liable under a theory of
intentional infliction of emotional distress. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965)
(noting that "[o]ne who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes
severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if
bodily harm... results from it, for such bodily harn"); see also J.D. LEE & BARRY A.
LINDAHL, MODERN TORT LAW: LIABILITY AND LITIGATION § 47.23, at 49 (rev. ed. 2000)
(noting that while an insurer's denial or delay of payment may be permissible, "[w]hen an
insurer employs various forms of coercion, intimidation, or harassment tactics against an
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B. Practical, Legal, and Competing Policy Issues
Because contractual ADRtakes place outside thejudicial arena, few reported cases
discuss conduct-participation issues in private ADR proceedings. However,
misconduct arising out of a private ADR process has been the basis for seeking to
avoid compulsory ADR proceedings, to void awards or agreements resulting from
private ADR, or to establish fraud liability.-' Frustrated by Kaiser Permanente's
repeated and documented dilatory conduct, the plaintiffs inEngalla finally filed their
medical malpractice claims in state court after years of attempting to arbitrate a
resolution.' The court held that Kaiser's actions in delaying appointment ofa neutral
arbitrator constituted both fraud in the inducement of the arbitration provision and
waiver of its right to compel arbitration. 52 The court's approach, in finding fraud in
the inducement of the arbitration clause, was perhaps stretched to find some remedy
but did not address the real problem, which was the defendant's conduct at the
enforcement stage. Perhaps at the time the parties entered the contract, Kaiser did not
intend to delay or obstruct the stipulated dispute resolution procedure. The
misconduct occurred years after the parties entered into the contract when the
plaintiffs sought to avail themselves of the arbitration process.5 At that time the duty
to participate in the contractually mandated ADR process in good faith was triggered
and violated. 4 The case illustrates the inherent potential for misconduct and
procedural abuse in private ADR systems as well as the need for redress against
misconduct in a private ADR setting, regardless of initial intent in promulgating the
mandatory ADR provision. This need for both redress and recognition of an
independent cause of action for breach of a good-faith requirement, or, in egregious
cases, for bad faith or tort liability based on ADR misconduct, must also be weighed
against the competing policy concerns of confidentiality, flexibility in ADR, and
satellite litigation.
Recognizing a duty of private ADR participants to engage in the process in good
faith raises various practical, enforcement, and legal issues: (1) How is the duty of
good faith defined and measured?; (2) How, when, and by whom will enforcement
be made?; (3) What are the consequences, sanctions, or remedies?; and (4) Do
confidentiality privileges within ADR limit the ability to prove a bad-faith claim? 55
insured, even to enforce its legal rights, the conduct may become extreme and outrageous
enough so that liability will attach for the severe emotional distress which results").
150. See Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line, Ltd., 943 F.2d 1056, 1063 (9th Cir. 1991)
(affirming arbitrator's award of attorney fees under the bad-faith-conduct exception to the
American rule, despite lack of contractual provision for attorney fees to prevailing party, as a
consequence ofdefendant's improper and bad-faith conduct, which unnecessarilyextended the
arbitration).
151. See supra text accompanying notes 68-76 (discussing Engalla).
152. Engallav. Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 938 P.2d 903 (Cal. 1997).
153, Id. at 908-09.
154. Id. at 921.
155. The question of whether third-party neutrals are immune from liability under doctrines
of quasi-judicial immunity bars is beyond the scope of this Article. For an analysis of the
debate on whether immunity should be accorded to mediators or arbitrators, see Chaykin,
supra note 24, at 760-64 (arguing for mediator liability under a fiduciary duty standard). See
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Against this backdrop lie competing policy concerns of whether recognizing a good-
faith duty or a concomitant bad-faith liability claim as a result of private ADR
conduct would induce satellite litigation and further undermine ADR goals of
efficiency, flexibility, and confidentiality. While these questions appear to pose
significant obstacles, a closer examination demonstrates that neither the practical and
enforcement issues nor legal doctrines should preclude a requirement for fair conduct
in an ADR process.
C. Analyzing Good-Faith Provisions in Related Contexts
Defining good-faith participation in an ADR context appears problematic because
the concept seems vague and lacking in objective standards." Such a requirement is
useful only if it provides sufficient guidance to participants concerning their roles,
responsibilities, and potential consequences. If a duty of good faith is implicit under
contract law and arises out of the parties' contractual agreements to use ADR, then
attempts must be made to define what constitutes good-faith participation in an ADR
setting, regardless of whether one agrees that such a requirement or duty is good or
bad. An analogous good-faith duty exists in a number of other statutes and procedural
rules rooted in policies designed to ensure process integrity and fairness in bargaining
and dispute resolution. Legislatures have not shied away from the need to make
explicit a duty of good faith because of difficulties in defining all contours of the
duty. Thus, the definitional discussions developed in other contexts help define what
may constitute bad faith in an ADR process.
For example, the "duty to bargain in good faith" is codified in the National Labor
Relations Act ("NLRA")"57 for collective bargaining between union and corporate
also Arthur A. Chaykin, The Liabilities and Immunities ofMediators: A Hostile Environment
for Model Legislation, 2 OHIo ST. J. ONDISP. RESOL 47 (1986) (arguing for mediator liability
under a fiduciary duty standard); Caroline Turner English, Mediator Immunity: Stretching the
Doctrine ofAbsolute Quasi-JudicialImmunity: Wagshal v. Foster, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 759
(1995) (arguing that abroad grant ofinimunityformediators is unwarranted); Dennis I Nolan
& Roger I. Abrams, ArbitralImmunity, 11 INDUS. REL L. J. 228 (1989) (offeringjustifications
for arbitral immunity); Mark A. Sponseller, Note, RedefiningArbitral Immunity: A Proposed
Qualified Immunity Statute for Arbitrators, 44 HASTINGs L.J. 421, 441-43 (1993)
(recommending legislative adoption of a qualified immunity standard for arbitrators); Paul J.
Dubow, Tweaking Arbitration, Can the RUAA Fill the Gaps in the FAA?, Bus. L. TODAY,
Sept.-Oct. 1999, at 46 (noting debate of whether the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act should
confer judicial immunity for arbitrators and arbitration institutions).
156. See Sherman, supra note 5, at 2093. Professor Sherman asserts that the good-faith-
participation requirement is inherently ambiguous, is phrased in terms of subjective intent, and
seems to require an examination into a party's motives rather than its objective conduct. Id. Yet
Sherman advocates a seemingly indistinguishable "minimum meaningful participation"
standard based on objective information and an exchange of position papers. Id. at 2094-96.
While this seemingly more objective standard might be workable pursuant to rules in a court-
annexed program, the obligation does not arise as a matter of law in a private ADR setting. The
good-faith requirement does arise as a matter of law but can also be defined in objective
standards. See infra Part V.D.
157. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994). In particular, § 158(d) describes the duties of both
employers and employees
[Vol. 76:591
CHECKS ON CONDUCTIN COMPULSORYADR
employers. Notably, the provision was added to counteractpower imbalances in labor
negotiations."" This duty does not require that the parties reach settlement, only that
they genuinely participate in the process.5 9 Courts determining whether a party acted
in good faith have used both an objective and subjective test, examining whether the
conduct fell within a list of enumerated per se violations,"w or whether the conduct,
under the "totality of the circumstances," violated the duty.'
6
'
Similarly, in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Congress mandated thatparties
"negotiate in good faith.., the particular terms and conditions of [interconnection]
to bargain collectively [in] the performance of the mutual obligation of the
employer and the representative of the employees to meet at [a] reasonable time]
and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment... but such obligation does not compel either party
to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession ....
Id. § 158(d).
158. See Romer, supra note 142, at 270-74 (describing the history of the good-faith
negotiation clause in labor law). In defining the meaning of good faith and fair dealing in a
contractual context, Professor Farnsworth acknowledges:
The analogy from ordinary contract negotiations to collective bargaining is, to be
sure, less than perfect. In ordinary contract negotiations there is no public interest
in a successful outcome that is comparable to the interest in preventing labor
strife. The relationship between the parties is not necessarily a continuing one,
and neither party is bound to deal exclusively with the other. . . .Nevertheless,
helpful comparisons can be made, as courts applying the NLRA have recognized
by drawing analogies to ordinary contract negotiations.
FARNSWORTH, supra note 143, § 3.26c, at 378. In a compulsory ADR context, parties are
bound to deal with one another and the waiver of adjudicatory due process rights triggers
public interest in ensuring a fair process. See Estreicher, supra note 15, at 1349-50 (arguing
that essential safeguards are needed for compulsory arbitration).
159. Romer, supra note 142, at 272 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 158(d), which provides that the duty
to bargain "does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a
concession"). The NLRA's statutory definition of good-faith bargaining encompasses a wide
range of behavior and contemplates genuine participation in negotiation. Steven L Burton,
Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARV. L. REV.
369, 392-94 (1980); Archibald Cox, The Duty to 'Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HARV. L. REV.
1401, 1442 (1958).
160. E.g., NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962) (providing examples of per se violations);
FARNSWORTH, supra note 143, § 3.26c, at 378 (defining categories of unfair dealing to include
refusal to negotiate, imposing improper conditions or using improper tactics, making
unreasonable proposals, nondisclosure, negotiation with others, reneging, and breaking off
negotiations).
161. FARNSWORTH, supra note 143, § 3.26c, at 337. Farnsworth notes that the NLRA
requires state of mind to be inferred from observable conduct:
Because a party will rarely announce an intention to bargain in bad faith, courts
have had to look for subtler manifestations such as refusing to disclose
information relevant to the negotiations... engaging in dilatory tactics, or
withholding agreement on trivial matters. Courts would have to show the same
attention to all the circumstances in determining whether parties to ordinary
contract negotiations have met a standard of fair dealing.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Romer, supra note 142, at 273.
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agreements."'' Following the NLRA approach, the Federal Communications
Commission's ("FCC") implementing regulations also establish a two-part test to
determine compliance with the duty to negotiate in good faith." Liability is
evidenced under an objective standard by specific prohibited actions constituting a
per se violation of the duty to negotiate in good faith.'" Alternatively, a separate
subjective test for good-faith negotiation permits the adjudicating body discretion to
sanction a wide range of conduct indicating whether a party "intentionally misled or
coerced a party into reaching an agreement . . [or] intentionally obstructed or
delayed negotiations."' 65
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(f) (and state counterparts) authorizes sanctions
if parties or their attorneys do not comply with terms of a court's pretrial conference
order, are "substantially unprepared to participate," or fail "to participate in good
faith."'" Thus, courts have imposed requirements for good-faith participation in
pretrial conferences with defining factors including attendance by party principals,
adequate preparation, providing timely discovery and position statements to opposing
parties and the judge or neutral, obtaining settlement authority or advising opponents
otherwise, and complying with other matters set forth in the court's pretrial order. 67
Again, the UCC and Restatement (Second) of Contracts recognize a duty of good
162. 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(1) (Supp. IV 1998).
163. See Romer, supra note 142, at 273.
164. Id. at 268 n.64 (citing 47 C.F.R. § 5 1.301 (2000)). 47 C.F.R. § 51.301 defines per se
violations of the duty to negotiate in good faith to include, inter alia,
(5) Intentionally misleading or coercing another party into reaching an
agreement that it would not otherwise have made;
(6) Intentionally obstructing ordelaying negotiations orresolutions ofdisputes;
(7) Refusing throughout the negotiation process to designate a representative
with authorityto make binding representations, ifsuch refusal significantly delays
resolution of issues; and
(8) Refusing to provide information necessary to reach agreement.
47 C.F.R. § 51.301(c)(5)-(8) (1999).
165. Romer, supra note 142, at 268 (emphasis omitted) (recognizing that subjective-based
determination of good faith requires a case-by-case evaluation). The Bankruptcy Code also
requires that a plan be proposed in good faith under I 1 U.S.C. § 303(i)(2) (1994). See In re
Bayshore Wire Prod., 209 F.3d 100, 106 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting that numerous tests have been
developed for determining whether a creditor's Chapter 7 petition has been filed in "bad faith"
for purposes of§ 303(i)(2), which authorizes the imposition of damages against the creditor).
Tests of bad faith include determining whether the filing was for an improper use or improper
purpose based on what a reasonable person would have believed, or an objective analysis
similar to the standard under Bankruptcy Rule 9011. Id.
166. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(f).
167. Francis v. Women's Obstetrics & Gynecology Group, P.C., 144 F.R.D. 646, 647-48
(W.D.N.Y. 1992) (noting that Rule 16 empowers a court to require parties to be prepared and
to participate in good faith in a pretrial conference). "Thus, parties or their attorneys must
evaluate discovered facts and intelligently analyze legal issues before the start of pretrial
conferences." Id. (quoting In re Novak, 932 F.2d 1397, 1405 (1 lth Cir. 1991)); see also
Kovach, supra note 13, at 611 ("Many courts agree that to impose a duty of.good faith on
negotiators does not mean that the parties must reach a settlement. Good faith simply requires
that the parties make a genuine push towards a solution.").
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faith and fair dealing in the performance of a contract, defined in the UCC as
consisting of "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned."' The
Restatement defines good-faith performance or enforcement of a contract as
"emphasiz[ing] faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and consistency with the
justified expectations of the other party; it excludes a variety of types of conduct
characterized as involving 'bad faith' because they violate community standards of
decency, fairness or reasonableness."'"
In the insurance context, bad faith is defined to include situations where the insurer
had no reasonable basis for its denial of, or refusal to, settle claims, failed to
investigate a claim, or failed to keep the insured informed about all case
developments, including settlement offers.17 0
Professional ethics rules also hold attorneys to a minimal obligation to act in good
faith in negotiations and, by extension, in an ADR process.' The Model Rules of
168. U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (2000). Inthe case ofamerchant, goodfaithmeans "honestyin fact
and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade." Id. § 2-
103(l)(b); see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 142, § 205 (stating that "[elvery contract
imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its
enforcement").
169. RESTATEMENT, supra note 142, § 205 cmt. a; see also id. cmt. d.
Subterfuges and evasions violate the obligation ofgood faith in performance even
though the actor believes his conduct to be justified. But the obligation goes
further bad faith may be overt or may consist of inaction, and fair dealing may
require more than honesty. A complete catalogue of types of bad faith is
impossible, but the following types are among those which have been recognized
in judicial decisions: evasion of the spirit of the bargain, lack of diligence and
slacking off, willful rendering of imperfect performance, abuse of a power to
specify terms, and interference with or failure to cooperate in the other party's
performance.
Id.; see also Crisci v. Sec. Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173 (Cal. 1967) (allowing recovery for mental
distress in addition to recovery in excess of policy limits); FARNSWORTH, supra note 143, §
12.8, at 564-65 (citing Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 198 (Cal. 1958)
(holding that insurer who fails to accept reasonable settlement offer from third party is liable
for the entire judgment against insured though it exceeded policy limits)); supra Part V.A.
170. Kovach, supra note 13, at 612-13. A court has noted that signs of bad faith include
situations in which the insurer's
stated reason for denial makes no legal or factual sense; different reasons for
denial are given on separate occasions; denial took place before there was any
significant investigation of the claim; or an investigation took place, but the
investigation was conducted so as to support a denial rather than to determine the
validity of a claim... [as well as] failure to communicate with [or to provide
information to] the insured.
Id. at 613; see also Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Underwood, 791 S.W.2d 635,647 (Tex. App. 1990);
LEE & LINDAHL, supra note 149, § 47.15, at 47-40 to 47-41 (listing settlement practices that
suggest possible grounds for bad-faith actions); supra Part V.A.
171. Biller, supra note 109, at 293 (asserting that "[a]ttomeys involved in court-mandated
mediation owe a duty to uphold this process and to use it for its legitimate purposes" (citing
N.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. (1994) ("A lawyer should use the law's procedures
only for legitimate purposes and not to harass or intimidate others. A lawyer should
demonstrate respect for the legal system .... [li]t is also a lawyer's duty to uphold legal
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Professional Conduct require truthfulness in statements to others,172 and fairness to
opposing party and counsel. Fairness requires truth in dealing with others on a
client's behalf, as well as disclosure when necessary to avoid assisting in a client's
fraud. It is also professional misconduct for an attorney to "engage in conduct that
is prejudicial to the administration of justice."'7 5
D. Defining Good-Faith Participation in Mediation and Arbitration
Even recognizing other statutes and contexts in which a duty of good faith applies,
admittedly a clear definition of such a duty in an ADR context is wanting. The
tempting way out is simply to proclaim that the duty exists and then assume bad faith
is "like obscenity-you know it when you see it.' 76 Parties who are bound
contractually to resolve disputes outside the judicial arena and in a private ADR
forum have the requisite relationship to be held to an obligation to use the applicable
ADR process in good faith. The duty to participate in an ADR process relates to the
participants' conduct and does not create a duty for the parties to compromise or
disclose work product or trial strategy.' This means that parties subject to a good-
faith duty to participate are notprecluded from self-interest, hard bargaining, or even
refusal to make or accept a settlement offer.78 How then is good faith measured and
process." (alteration added)))); Kovach, supra note 13, at 622 (proposing model rule for
lawyers requiring good-faith participation in the mediation process).
172. MODELRULEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1 cmt. (1999).
173. Id. R. 3.4.
174. Id. R. 4.1.
In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly:
(a) make a false statement of a material fact or law to a third person; or
(b) fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure is necessary
to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is
prohibited by Rule 1.6 [regarding maintaining client confidences].
Id.; see also ROGER FISHER ET AL, GETTING TO YEs: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT
GIVING IN 134 (2d ed. 1991) (stating that "[g]ood faith negotiation does not require total
disclosure"); Gerald B. Wetlaufer, TheEthics ofLyingin Negotiations, 75 IOWAL. REV. 1219,
1272 (1990).
175. MODELRULESOFPROF'LCONDUCTR. 8.4 (stating that "[i]t is professional misconduct
for a lawyer to... engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation
... [or] engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration ofjustice").
176. Kovach, supra note 13, at 600; Romer, supra note 142, at 289 & n.227 (characterizing
Professor Robert S. Summers's description of good faith as the absence of bad-faith conduct,
see infra note 180, as really saying, "I can't tell you what bad faith is except that I'll know it
when I see it" (quoting Steven J. Burton, More on Good Faith Peformance of a Contract: A
Reply to Professor Summers, 69 IOWA L. REV. 497, 499 (1984) (developing a model for
analysis to identify not only the existence of bad faith, but also of good faith, based on abuse
of discretion to recapture lost opportunities))).
177. See Nick v. Morgan's Foods, Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1061 (E.D. Mo. 2000) (good-
faith participation in ADR does not require settlement).
178. Dawson v. United States, 68 F.3d 886 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that good faith does not
require a party to settle or to make a settlement offer); Feldman v. Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 850
F.2d 1217, 1223 (7th Cir. 1988); The Feldman court held:
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defined in a process where the parties are in conflict and where advocacy, self-
interest, zealous representation, and hard bargaining are still acceptable and part of
the process?
Particularly because advocacy is still necessary in both arbitration and mediation,
bad faith needs to be defined and distinguished from competitive negotiation
behaviors, self-interest, or even hard bargaining.' As important as defining "good-
faith participation" is clarifying what such a requirement excludes."' ° For example,
failure to settle or even mere refusal to settle is not bad faith. 8' Hard bargaining and
competitive negotiation on substantive matters or the merits should be distinguished
from conduct that is obstreperous, coercive, and calculated to thwart the ADR
process."2
The good-faith-participation duty pertains to the manner of the ADR proceeding
and to conduct that frustrates the process, not to the merits of the underlying claims
or defenses, to the substance of offers, or to whether the parties settled." The
objective or minimal aspects of good-faith participation should be clarified and
distinguished from advocacy. Other conduct, when viewed in totality to evidence
frustration or circumvention of the ADR process, should also be examined. In this
respect, the two-step approach of the NLRA seems most helpful.
In a business transaction both sides presumably try to get the best of the deal.
That is the essence of bargaining and the free market .... So one cannot
characterize self-interest as bad faith. No particular demand in negotiations could
be termed dishonest, even if it seemed outrageous to the other party. The proper
recourse is to walk away from the bargaining table, not to sue for 'bad faith' in
negotiations.
Id.; see also Kovach, supra note 13, at 610 (clarifying that good faith does not require reaching
an agreement, having to disclose everything about one's case, or "being nice").
179. See Peter Robinson, Contending with Wolves in Sheep's Clothing: A Cautiously
Cooperative Approach to Mediation Advocacy, 50 BAYIoR L. REv. 963 (1998) (contrasting
competitive and cooperative negotiation and mediation advocacy styles and behavior from bad
faith).
180. Robert S. Summers, "Good Faith " in General ContractLaw and the Sales Provisions
of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195, 200-07 (1968) (using an "excluder"
analysis to conceptualize the good-faith obligation and arguing that good faith is best defined
by classifying instances of bad faith); see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 142, § 205 cmt. a
(adopting Summers's excluder approach and providing example categories indicating bad-faith
performance).
181. See Triplett v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 741 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (holding
insurer could not be punished for insisting on its constitutional right to a jury trial in lieu of
settlement even if its motives were improper where there was no evidence the insurer impeded
the progress of the litigation or refused to participate in pretrial discovery or conferences).
182. The duty ofgood-faith participation relates to the requirement to participate in the ADR
process, not a requirement to negotiate substantive terms in good faith. Thus, a refusal to make
an offer of compromise, for example, should not be construed as bad faith and may very well
be justified by the merits of the case.
183. See Kovach, supra note 13, at 603.
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1. Minimal Per Se Aspects of Good-Faith Participation
An objective standard of what constitutes bad-faith participation in ADR should
identify minimal aspects of good-faith participation or, as a corollary, specify
prohibited conduct akin to the NLRA's list of per se violations, to provide notice of
minimal aspects of good-faith participation. This would include conduct such as the
failure of lawyers or principals to attend, sending negotiators without authority,
refusal to provide necessary and unprivileged information or witnesses, and repeated
delays and postponement of meetings or hearings.'"
Additional objective conduct inherent in good-faithparticipation may varywith the
type of ADR procedure used. Because of the adversarial nature of arbitration and
direct negotiation context of mediation, the standard in the two processes may slightly
differ. In arbitration, minimal good-faith participation includes timeliness in selecting
arbitrators and scheduling the arbitration, reasonable exchange and disclosure of
relevant information, the right to present one's case with or without counsel, sharing
reasonable expenses, and a written award." 5 In mediation, personal attendance by
parties with authorization to settle, preparation and exchange of requested documents,
engaging in discussions, making no misrepresentations, and remaining at the
mediation for a reasonable time are minimal participation obligations."
184. Sherman, supra note 5, at 2096-97. Sherman recommends that minimal participation
in mediation requires that parties briefly state their positions, listen to the other side, and react
to the other side's positions. Id. More participation and case presentation maybe necessary for
minimal participation in other evaluative forms of ADR, such as arbitration and summaryjury
trial, but the requirement should not interfere with trial strategy or discovery and work product
privileges. Id. Minnesota's Farmer-Lender Mediation Act requiring good-faith participation
identifies conduct that violates the requirement, including:
(1) a failure on a regular or continuing basis to attend and participate in mediation
sessions without cause; (2) failure to provide full information regarding the
financial obligations of the parties and other creditors... ; (3) failure of the
creditor to designate a representative to participate in the mediation with authority
to make binding commitments within one business day to fully settle,
compromise, or otherwise mediate the matter; (4) lack of a written statement of
debt restructuring alternatives and a statement of reasons why alternatives are
unacceptable to one of the parties; (5) failure of a creditor to release funds from
the sale of farm products to the debtor for necessary living and farm operating
expenses; or (6) other similar behavior which evidences lack of good faith by the
party.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 583.27 subd. 1(a) (West 2000).
185. See Estreicher, supra note 15, at 1349-50 (defining essential safeguards to ensure a fair
hearing in arbitration to include standards of competency for arbitrators, a "reasonable place
for the holding of the arbitration," fair methods for obtaining information from the other side,
a fair method for sharing costs, a right to counsel, "a range of remedies equal to those available
from the other side, a range of remedies equal to those available through litigation," a written
award, and judicial review (citing COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE & U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 31 (1994))).
186. Kovach, supra note 13, at 622-23. Professor Kovach proposes a statutory basis
requiring all parties and their counsel to participate in mediation in good faith. In addition to
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Third-party neutrals are also subject to a good-faith duty by undertaking a
contractual role to act as an ADR neutral to the parties. The duties of mediators and
arbitrators set out in various ethical codes and standards promulgated by
organizations such as the American Arbitration Association provide guidelines for
determining the good-faith participation of neutrals. 1" Although these codes provide
no enforcement mechanism, they can provide a working definition of good faith."
These standards oblige neutrals to uphold the integrity and fairness of the respective
ADR processes and to comply, inter alia, with basic duties of impartiality,
confidentiality, and competence.'8 9 A willful violation of these duties, bias, or undue
pressure tactics to coerce settlement would violate a good-faith requirement and
might provide grounds for independent third-party neutral sanction or liability.'I
requiring compliance with the terms and provisions of applicable statutes, rules, or court orders
for mediation, Kovach defines "good faith" in mediation to include, inter alia,
(d) Personal attendance at the mediation by all parties who are fully authorized
to settle the dispute, which shall NOT be construed to include anyone present by
telephone;
(e) Preparation for the mediation by the parties and their representatives, which
includes the exchange of any documents requested or as set forth in a rule, order,
or request of the mediator;
(f) Participation in meaningful discussions with the mediator and all other
participants during the mediation;
(g) Compliance with all contractual terms regarding mediation which the parties
may have previously agreed to;
(h) Following the rules set out by the mediator during the introductory phase of
the process;
(i) Remaining at the mediation until the mediator determines that the process is
at an end or excuses the parties;
(j) Engaging in direct communications and discussion between the parties to the
dispute, as facilitated by the mediator;
(k) Making no affirmative misrepresentations or misleading statements to the
other parties or the mediator during the mediation; and
(l) In pending lawsuits, refraining from filing any new motions until the
conclusion of the mediation ....
Id. (emphasis in original).
187. See, e.g., ARBIrrATORs' ETIUCSCODE, supranote 58; MODELSTANDARDS, supra note
8, cited in KOVACH, supra note I, app. B.
188. See ARBITRAToR' ETHIcs CODE, supra note 58; MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 8,
cited in KOVACH, supra note 1, app. B; Jamie Henikoff& Michael Moffltt, Remodeling the
Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators, 2 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 87, 106 (1997)
(recommending standards of neutrality, self-determination, and informed consent).
189. E.g., MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 8, R. 11, IV, V (noting mediators' duties to
comply with the principle of self-determination, to conduct the proceedings fairly and
diligently, and to avoid coercion and pressuring parties to settle); Chaykin, supra note 24, at
744-54 (discussing mediator ethical duties).
190. Chaykin, supra note 24, at 762-63 (stating that "bad faith" in mediation should be
defined as "palpable bias" towards one of the parties); see supra note 155 (referencing debate
in whether to accord immunity to third-party neutrals).
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2. A Totality-of-the-Circumstances Test of Conduct Fairness
Because a list of prohibited conduct cannot usually anticipate all violations, a test
of good-faith participation should include an alternative totality-of-the-circumstances
standard evidencing process abuse. Violations of the good-faith requirement can be
measured objectively by a course of conduct abusive of the process, such as using the
ADR process for the sole purpose of discovery or to outspend or harass the other
side, and other coercion or pressure tactics.' 9' Sanction provisions under the
procedural rules provide similar discretion to penalize process abuse in the judicial
system.1
92
In advocating a good-faith standard in mediation,"" Professor Kovach identified
examples of bad faith and process abuse in mediation.
One specific example of process abuse is the request of mediation for the sole
purpose of discovery.... Similarly, mediation has been used only to assess the
other side in terms of their potential effectiveness at trial. Another objective is to
wear down a litigant where one party is more financially able than the other. By
scheduling a mediation or urging a court to order the process where there is no
intent to settle, but where the parties share the expense equally, the process can
drain the other's resources so that the financially challenged party must choose
between paying for the mediation or the attorney. 19'
Other indicia of bad-faith participation include "unexpected delays in answering
correspondence; postponement of meetings; sending negotiators without authority to
settle; repudiating commitments made during bargaining; shifting positions;
interjecting new demands; insisting on a verbatim transcript of the negotiation;
refusal to sign a written agreement; unilateral action; and withholding of valuable
information."'95 Bad faith is also indicated bya party structuring or forcing a patently
unfair ADR process" and by the refusal to identify witnesses or to offer any
evidence or response. 9
191. FARNSWORT, supra note 143, § 3.26c, at 337 (noting that bad-faith intent must be
inferred from observable conduct "[b]ecause a party will rarely announce an intention to
bargain in bad faith"); Kovach, supra note 13, at 593-94.
192. E.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (b) (authorizing courts to measure conduct deemed frivolous,
harassing, or vexatious based upon an objective inquiry reasonable under the circumstances);
FED. R. Crv. P. 37 (authorizing sanctions for abuses in the discovery process).
193. Kovach, supra note 13, at 597-98.
194. Id. at 593-94.
195. Id. at 612 (citing Cox, supra note 159, at 1418-25).
196. E.g., Floss v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., 211 F.3d 306, 315 (6th Cir. 2000)
(holding that predispute arbitration agreement between employee and arbitration service
provider engaged by employer, which gives provider "unfettered discretion" to alter applicable
rules and procedures without notice of consent of employee, is void for lack of consideration);
Engalla v. Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 938 P.2d 903 (Cal. 1997).
197. See Wahle v. Med. Ctr. of Del., Inc., 559 A.2d 1228, 1233 (Del. 1989) (considering
the sanctioned party's conduct throughout the entire period and stating a "seven-month abuse
of the arbitration process was followed and compounded by ten months of inaction, disregard,
and breach of pretrial scheduling, discovery and production orders of the court, compliance
with which is essential for the proper functioning of the judicial system").
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E. Enforcement, Sanctions, and Remedies
Determining appropriate enforcement, sanctions, andremedies forbreachofa duty
to participate in private ADR in good faith poses both practical and policy
considerations, particularly regarding the role of the neutral and of confidentiality.
1. How, Where, and When?
Enforcement of the good-faith-participation requirement in the ADR proceeding
itself by the neutral, who likely witnesses the alleged misconduct, or even a finding
by the neutral of a party's bad faith in the ADR process, would be most efficient
promptly to address misconduct and party or process abuse. 9' In arbitration, the
arbitrator could sanction a party or attorney for process abuse, unless the parties
prescribe the arbitrator's powers otherwise. In mediation, however, a private neutral
lacks power to impose sanctions or conduct requirements on the parties, other than
to encourage the parties to commit to proceed in good faith or to terminate the
session.' The parties may agree as part of their contract with the neutral to authorize
the neutral to enforce the good-faith requirement and specify the procedure for
enforcement (such as a progressive discipline/warning process) and sanctions.2°
Action by the neutral regarding party conduct in an ADR proceeding, however, may
taint the parties' view of the neutral's impartiality, impair full use of the process, and
infringe on confidentiality protections or assurances?"l
The alternative is judicial recourse for violation of the duty of good faith in a
separate lawsuit. While seemingly antithetical to ADR ideals, satellite litigationbased
on private ADR misconduct may be warranted in order to ensure enforcement and
conduct fairness in ADR. The timing question is whether an action may be brought
during the process or after the ADRproceeding is concluded. By waiting, the conduct
may persist and the aggrieved party may be required to endure additional costs,
frustration, and abuse. Yet running to the courts in the middle of an ADR process
complaining of lack of good faith might induce unwarranted litigation and
gamesmanship that could potentially be resolved in the ADR proceeding. To deter
disgruntled parties from unwarranted claims of bad faith, the equivalent of an
exhaustion requirement, fee-shifling or "safe harbor" provision used to discourage
sanction threats should apply.2' Thus, as a prerequisite to judicial relief, a court
198. In court-ordered ADR, either the court or the third-party neutral, subject to the court's
review, may determine whether a party violated the good-faith duty and impose sanctions
accordingly. See Alfini, supra note 15, at 63; Biller, supra note 109, at 292.
199. For example, some statutes obligate a mediator to terminate a session "when it appears
continuation would harm or prejudice any party." OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, ch. 37, app. A
§ B(1)(e)(1) (West 1993).
200. See Kovach, supra note 13, at 617-18 (suggesting another option "of automatic
sanctions, which could be provided through a liquidated damages provision in the agreement
to mediate").
201. Parties may be reluctant to engage in necessary dialogue and fully to disclose their
positions, case strengths, and case weaknesses for fear that such disclosure could be construed
or used as evidence of bad faith.
202. See, e.g., FED. R. Ciw. P. 1 I(c)(1)(a) (providing that a motion for sanctions "shall not
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should require a party to identify the offensive conduct to the other party or neutral
and provide a reasonable opportunity for the conduct to cease.
2. Remedies and Sanctions for Bad-Faith Misconduct in ADR
Sanctions for violation of good-faith or participation standards in court-annexed
programs include costs, neutral and attorney fees, contempt, denial of trial de novo
(amounting to confirmation of an arbitrator's award), and dismissal of the pending
litigation."°3 Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court is authorized to
impose a variety of additional sanctions for a party's failure to participate in good
faith in pretrial conferences or with discovery orders.2' These sanctions include
prohibiting the disobedient party from supporting or opposing the designated claims
or defenses or from introducing certain matters in evidence, striking pleadings,
staying further proceedings, dismissing the action, or rendering a default judgment,
in lieu of or in addition to an order to pay expenses and attorney fees.20 5
In the course of a private arbitration, the arbitrator could impose sanctions similar
to the foregoing judicial sanctions. In mediation, a neutral's response to a showing
of bad faith could include imposing costs and fees on the offending party,
"terminating the [session], reallocating expenses, resetting the mediation, or
reporting to the court."' Where an independent action is filed, the traditional
remedies for breach of the duty of good faith permit recovery for compensatory
damages and, possibly, for attorney fees.' A claim for violation of the good-faith-
and-fair-dealing covenant based in tort, such as for egregious bad faith, fraud, or
be filed with or presented to the court unless, within 21 days after service of the motion... the
challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, allegation, or denial is not withdrawn or
appropriately corrected"); FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(2)(A) (requiring that a movant seeking
sanctions and compelling disclosures "must include a certification that the movant has in good
faith conferred or attempted to confer with the party not making the disclosure in an effort to
secure the disclosure without court action"). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a) permits a
party to file a motion to compel discovery. The rule's safeguard against frivolous motions
provides that the party prevailing on the motion is entitled to recover "reasonable expenses
incurred in making the motion, including attorney's fees." FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4XA). This
fee-shifting provision provides deterrence to the filing of unwarranted motions. Similarly, any
rule related to reporting of bad-fath-participation claims should incorporate a fee-shifting
provision to cause a paity seeking sanctions against another forbad faith to pause and consider
the benefits and risks of claiming bad faith.
203. English, supra note 20, at 584-88, 589-94, 601-04.
204. FED. R. CIv. P. 16(o.
205. Id.; FED. R. CIv. P. 37(c)(2); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 37(g) (authorizing the court to
require a party who fails to participate in good faith in the development of a discovery plan to
pay reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, caused by the failure).
206. Kovach, supra note 13, at 618.
207. Damages for breach of contract are generally limited to compensatory damages. See
LEE & LINDAH, supra note 149, § 47.25, at 47-57 (noting that under the American rule, each
party is responsible for his own attorney fees). However, the Ninth Circuit has recognized a
bad-faith-conduct exception to the American rule based on a defendant's improper and bad-
faith conduct that unnecessarily extends an arbitration. See Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard
Line, Ltd., 943 F.2d 1056, 1063-64 (9th Cir. 1991).
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intentional infliction of emotional distress, expands recovery for punitive, emotional
distress damages, and attorney fees. Where the good-faith ADR participation
standard is codified to cover both private and court-connected programs, a statutory
provision for sanctions should allow recovery for compensatory damages, as well as
an attorney fee-shifting option to the prevailing party, similar to the provision in
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37, to deter unwarranted claims of bad-faith
participation.'
F. Problems of Proof. Impact of Confidentiality Privileges
on Proving Bad Faith
A critical difficulty in enforcing a good-faith-participation requirement lies in
manners of proof. As illustrated in Foxgate, proving lack of good faith, misconduct,
or abuse in an ADR process may require disclosure of information, communications,
and conduct about the underlying private ADR session and testimony by the neutral
and parties.210 This disclosure seemingly abridges the confidentiality presumably or
expressly accorded to such proceedings. Evidentiary exclusionsjudicial or statutory
confidentiality privileges, and even parties' contractual confidentiality provisions
protect much of what goes on in an ADR proceeding. Confidentiality in ADR is
popularly viewed as crucial to the effectiveness of ADR and to participants'
willingness to use such procedures.2 t The confidentiality accorded to ADR
proceedings is designed to promote the party candor, disclosures, and compromise
discussions needed to resolve disputes. After-the-fact allegations of ADR bad-faith
conduct can undermine participants' trust in the confidentiality of ADR, create
uncertainty, and potentially impair full use of the process. 2 Yet the good-faith-
participation requirements applied to party conduct in ADR proceedings are also
designed to ensure process integrity and procedural fairness. The requirement is
essentially meaningless if confidentiality privileges restrict the ability to report
violations. The following section examines the impact of evidentiary exclusions and
confidentiality privileges on the ability to report bad-faith conduct in an ADR setting.
208. See supra Part V.A.
209. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4) (requiring the court to order the payment of reasonable
expenses, including attorney fees, by the defeated party on a motion for discovery sanctions);
FED. R. CIV. P. I l(c)(l) (authorizing award of reasonable expenses and attorney fees incurred
in presenting or opposing a sanctions motion to the party prevailing on the motion).
210. FoxgateHomeowners Ass'n. v. Bramalea Cal., Inc., 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d916 (Cal. Ct. App.
2000), review granted, 999 P.2d 666 (Cal. 2000).
211. Parties in an ADR proceeding may generally avoid public airing of their disputes,
adverse publicity, and precedent.
212. 1 ROGERS &MCEWEN, supra note 10, § 9:12, at 32.
When [privilege] exceptions depend on the action of the other party after the
session, such as whether the other party challenges the validity of the agreement
or argues a failure to participate in good faith, they may particularly undermine
confidence in the confidentiality of the session. Participants cannot know as the
session unfolds whether their statements will later be discussed.
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1. Evidentiary Exclusions, Statutory Confidentiality
Privileges, and Contractual Provisions
Evidentiary rules provide limited protection to shield ADR communications from
admissibility in a judicial setting. For example, Federal Rule of Evidence 408213
precludes admissibility in court of evidence of offers to compromise, including
conduct and statements made during settlement discussions and thus most ADR
proceedings, but only when offered to prove liability for, or invalidity of, a claim or
its amount.2 4 Rule 408 does permit such evidence when offered for "another
purpose," such as "proving bias or prejudice of a witness, negativing a contention of
undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or
prosecution."2 5 Courts have interpreted this list to be nonexhaustive, admitting
compromise discussions under the "another purpose" exception for various
reasons." 6 Under this exception, evidence offered to show misconduct or abuse of
213. Federal Rule of Evidence408 provides:
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting
or offering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or
attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or
amount, is not admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its
amount. Evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations is
likewise not admissible. This rule does not require the exclusion of any evidence
otherwise discoverable merely because it is presented in the course of
compromise negotiations. This rule also does not require exclusion when the
evidence is offeredfor another purpose, such a proving bias or prejudice of a
witness, negativing a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct
a criminal investigation or prosecution.
FED. R. EviD. 408 (emphasis added).
214. Rogers and McEwen explain:
Offers to compromise a disputed claim and responses to them, including
settlement agreements-whether made during a mini-trial, a mediation or
elsewhere-have traditionally been inadmissible to prove the validity or amount
of that claim in litigation. The evidentiary exclusion for compromise negotiations
serves both to encourage settlement discussions and to exclude evidence generally
of low probative weight, since the compromise might have been motivated by a
desire to buy peace rather than an acknowledgment of liability.
1 ROGERS & MCEWEN, supra note 10, § 9:03, at 6-7.
215. FED. R. EvlD. 408. The rule also does not require exclusion of evidence that is
"otherwise discoverable" merely because it is offered in the course of negotiations. Id.
216. 1 ROGERS &MCEWEN, supra note 10, § 9:06; at 15. Rogers and McEwen note case law
that has admitted compromise discussions or agreements under the "another purpose"
exception
for a variety of purposes not listed in Rule 408, including mitigation ofdamages,
knowledge and intent (admissibilityto show racial animus), conspiracy, adequacy
of class representatives, fairness of a class action settlement, prior inconsistent
statements, bad faith failure of an insurance carrier to settle, explanation about
background of dispute, motive, lack of bias ofa witness, and contradictions about
evidence of settlement negotiations introduced by an adverse party.
Id. at 15-16; see Johnson v. Hugo's Skateway, 949 F.2d 1338, 1345-47 (4th Cir. 1991)
(discussing mitigation, knowledge, and intent); Urico v. Parnell Oil Co., 708 F.2d 852, 854-55
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a good-faith requirement in an ADR process may be admissible unless otherwise
privileged.
ADR statutory privileges, as opposed to Rule 408's limited evidentiary exclusion,
generally provide broader confidentiality protection for ADR communications and
prevent disclosure not only at trial but also in discovery and other settings."
Although most states have some version of an ADR or mediation confidentiality
statute, the scope of protection and application varies by jurisdiction.2 . For example,
many statutes cover only court-annexed ADR programs.1 9 Contractual agreements
to maintain confidences or even assurances of confidentiality by the third-party
neutral, in either private or court-annexed ADR, may create false expectations of
confidentiality. Agreements to exclude evidence are disfavored and scrutinized under
public policy considerations °20 Therefore, contractual confidentiality provisions
would not necessarily bar evidence of violation of a good-faith requirement,
misconduct, or other process abuse under a public policy exception."
(Ist Cir. 1983) (admitting evidence to show bad-faith settlement negotiations made mitigation
impossible); Olin Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 603 F. Supp. 445, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
(discussing fairness of class action settlement, prior inconsistent statements, and bad-faith
failure to settle); see also Catullo v. Metzner, 834 F.2d 1075, 1078-79 (1 st Cir. 1987) (finding
it an error to exclude under Rule 408 testimony regarding terms of settlement agreement
presented to establish parties' intent); Bradshaw v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 758 P.2d
1313, 1322 (Ariz. 1988) (noting that the compromise discussion statements were offered for
a purpose other than liability or amount); Sonja A. Soehnel, Annotation, Evidence Involving
Compromise or Offer of Compromises as Inadmissible Under Rule 408 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence, 72 A.L.R. FED. 592 (1985).
217. Pamela A. Kentra, HearNo Evil, See No Evil, Speak No Evil: The Intolerable Conflict
forAttorney-Mediators Between the Duty to Maintain Mediation Confidentiality and the Duty
to Report Fellow Attorney Misconduct, 1997 BYU L. REV. 715, 733-34.
218. 1 ROGERS & MCEWEN, supra note 10, § 9:10, at 23-25. "Most mediation privileges
create the right to block more than admissibility at trial for particular purposes; they also create
a right to block compelled disclosure in discovery and other proceedings not governed by rules
of evidence." Id. § 9.10, at 22. "Many states have enacted statutes that provide varying degrees
of confidentiality to mediation programs. Some statutes create a full mediation privilege with
no exceptions, while others create a more limited protection with specific exceptions to the
confidentiality guarantee." Kentra, supra note 217, at 733. Adding to the confusion, many
states have more than one statute. Each statute grants differing degrees of confidentiality
protection to different mediation programs within the same state. Id.; see also Smith v. Sirdth,
154 F.R.D. 661,674-75 (N.D. Tex. 1994) (noting lack of uniformity and disagreement among
state mediation statutes on the scope of the right of confidentiality).
219. 1 ROGERS & MCEWEN, supra note 10, § 9:12, at 28 (noting that "[i]n the majority of
statutes, the mediation privilege protects only a particular publicly administered program").
220. EEOC v. Astra USA, Inc., 94 F.3d 738,744-45 (1 st Cir. 1996) (ruling that agreements
to keep evidence from a public tribunal are void as against public policy); Kirtley, supra note
81, at 10-11 (noting enforcement of written agreements to maintain confidences in mediation
is uncertain, as public policy forbids contracting to exclude evidence).
221. Parties may be barred from disclosure in nonjudicial contexts by private contractual
confidentiality provisions. Parazino v. Barnett Bank, 690 So. 2d 725, 728 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1997) (affirming dismissal and sanctions on plaintiffs who divulged to the media terms of
bank's settlement offer and information protected by a court-ordered andwritten confidentiality
agreement), case dismissed, 695 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 1997).
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Statutory confidentiality privileges provide the strongest source of protection for
ADR communications. Yet even this coverage is uncertain and depends upon the
jurisdiction's particular statute.. Few confidentiality statutes confer absolute
protection to ADR proceedings that prevent disclosures and discovery of all
communications and documents obtained during the process.m Most statutes provide
qualified confidentiality protection and pertain only to specific ADR programs.m
2. ADR Confidentiality Exceptions
Exceptions to ADR confidentiality privileges maybe explicit in a statute or created
by court rule or judicial opinion. Many state mediation privilege statutes expressly
exempt certain categories from confidentiality, such as
(1) admissions ofthreats to commit child abuse, acrime, a felony, physical/bodily
harm, and damage to property; (2) information pertinent to a crime; an action
claiming fraud or suits against the mediator; (3) information relating to the
commission of a crime during mediation[;] or (4) use of mediation information
for research purposes or non-identifiable reporting.... or when disclosure is
mandated by another statute or court.' 4
222. See Kirtley, supra note 81, at 10 (noting the limited and uncertain protection under
mediation confidentiality laws); Kentra, supra note 217, at 733; Kristina M. Kerwin, The
Discoverability ofSettlement and ADR Communications: Federal Rules ofEvidence 408 and
Beyond, 12 REv. LrrIG. 665,680-81 (1993) (describing the "mixedbag" ofprotection afforded
by state confidentiality statutes); Mindy D. Rufenacht, Comment, The Concern over
Confidentiality in Mediation-an In-Depth Look at the Protection Provided by the Proposed
Note Uniform Mediation Act, 2000 J. DISP. RESOL 113, 114 (describing the present variations
in state mediation confidentiality statutes).
223. See Rufenacht, supra note 222, at 114.
224. Kirtley, supra note 81, at 43-44. Kirtley also cites examples of various state
confidentiality statutes. Id. at 43 n.291 (citing CoLo. REV. STAT. § 13-22-307 (West 1997)
(defining the following exceptions to mediation confidentiality: all parties consent in writing
to disclosures; disclosure is required by statute; allegations involve intent to commit a felony,
infliction of bodily harm, or threatening the safety of a minor child; actions against the
mediator; otherwise discoverable information; and nonidentifiable disclosures for evaluation
and research purposes)). Connecticut's statute declares an exception if
(1) each of the parties agrees in writing to such disclosure, (2) the disclosure is
necessary to enforce a written agreement that came out of the mediation, (3) the
disclosure is required by statute or regulation, or by any court, after notice to all
parties to the mediation, or (4) the disclosure is required as a result of
circumstances in which a court finds that the interest ofjustice outweighs the need
for confidentiality, consistent with principles of law.
CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-235d(b) (West 1991 & Supp. 2000); see also FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 44.102(4) (West 1998 & Supp. 2000) (declaring an exception for use of mediation
information in disciplinary proceedings filed against mediators); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02
subd. 1(a) (West 2000) (stating that ADR privilege statute provides that a mediator is
incompetent to testify at a subsequent proceeding regarding statements made or conduct
occurring during the mediation except if those statements or conduct: "(1) constitute a crime;
(2) give rise to disqualification proceedings under the rules of professional conduct for
attorneys; or (3) constitute professional misconduct").
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Disclosure may also ensue where it is needed to promote the public's need for
evidence or where the need for the information outweighs confidentiality concerns.'
Courts have similarly considered, yet rejected, confidentiality assertions when
necessary to rule on motions to set aside ADR agreements on contractual defenses
such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability. In FDIC v. White," 6 the defendants
sought to set aside a mediated agreement, claiming the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation ("FDIC") coercedthemto settle in threatening criminalprosecution. The
FDIC argued that the defendants' affidavits should be inadmissible because
communications made during the mediation are privileged." The court ruled that the
Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998 ("ADRA") ' did not create a privilege
that prevents litigants from challenging settlement agreements by pointing to events
occurring during mediation? 9 The ADRA contains no suchbar against defenses such
as fraud, duress, coercion, or mutual mistake.?0 The court considered the evidence
but ultimately ruled that the FDIC did not coerce the defendants into settlement, and
upheld the mediated agreement' Disclosure of the parties' conduct at the ADR
225. See IROGERs&MCEWEN, supra note 10, § 9:12, at 29-31 (citing examples ofstatutory
exceptions to the mediation privilege to include allegations of crime, perjured testimony,
threats of injury or damage, applications to set aside or reform a mediated agreement, actions
between mediator and party for damages arising from the mediation, disagreements regarding
the validity of the mediated agreement, or allegations that a party, during marital mediation,
made a "'material misstatement of fact, which would have constituted perury if made under
oath' (quotingN.H.REv. STAT. ANN. § 328-C:9(b) (1995))); Kentra, supra note 217, at 735-
37 (noting statutory confidentiality exceptions intended to promote the public's need for
evidence if the information is "otherwise discoverable" or obtainable by "independent
investigation"; involves subsequent litigation between mediation participants; involves claims
ofprofessional misconduct; or is required for disclosure by statute or necessary for the conduct
of the mediation session). The Federal Administrative Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of
1990 creates a qualified ADR privilege but permits disclosure of ADR communications in
cases of "manifest injustice" orto protect public harm or safety. 5 U.S.C. § 574 (1994 & Supp.
V 1999); see also UNIF. MEDIATIONACT § 8 (Proposed Draft Feb. 2001) (providing exceptions
to confidentiality privilege for (1) record of an agreement, (2) meetings open by law and public
policymediations, (3) threats ofbodilyharm or unlawful property darage, (4) use ofimediation
to commit a crime, (5) evidence of abuse or neglect, (6) pretrial conferences, (7) to establish
the validity and enforceability of a mediated settlement agreement, and (8) significant threat
to public health or safety), available at http://www.pon.harvard.edu/guests/uma/
febwebUMA.htr.
226. 76 F. Supp. 2d 736 (N.D. Tex. 1999).
227. Id. at 737.
228. 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-658 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
229. White, 76 F. Supp. 2d at 738.
230. The ADRA includes an express statement of federal policy that communications
occurring in mediations sponsored by federal courts shall be confidential. See 28 U.S.C. §
652(d) (Supp. IV 1998) (directing federal courts to provide for confidentiality rules in court-
annexed ADR proceedings).
231. White, 76 F. Supp. 2d at 739; see also Randle v. MidGulf, Inc., No. 14-95-01292-CV,
1996 WL 447954, at *1 (Tex. App. Aug. 8, 1996) (admitting evidence from mediation
communications regarding duress defense in action by opposing party to enforce a mediation
agreement); Olam v. Cong. Mortgage Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1136,1138 (N.D. Cal. 1999)
(admitting mediator testimony on the issue of whether mediation involved undue influence).
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proceeding was necessary for the court to rule on the coercion claim. Adjudicating
claims of misconduct or bad-faith participation would necessitate similar treatment
but likewise raises confidentialityconcerns.
3. Crafting a Narrow Confidentiality Exception for
Good-Faith-Participation Violations
Few statutes or courts have directly addressed the question of whether evidence
relating to ADRmisconduct orbad-faith-participation claims warrant confidentiality-
privilege exceptions. 2 Foxgate created considerable controversy in ruling that the
trial court could rely upon mediator reports of a party's bad-faith conduct at a court-
orderedmediation, despite statutory confidentialityprovisions thatprecludemediator
reports and evidence of conduct at court-ordered ADR proceedings, to effectuate a
good-faith-participation requirement. 3
Recognizing a privilege exception to report good-faith violations carries the risk
that the exception would be misused by disgruntled parties and simply swallow the
confidentiality rule.' According to Foxgate, the exception to report good-faith
violations is narrowly construed. 5 But how much disclosure is enough, yet not too
much? A related concern arises when a party seeks to prove that an oral agreement
was reached in a mediation. Ruling evidence of statements made in a mediation
inadmissible to establish whether an oral settlement was reached, Ryan v. Garciae6
reasoned that admission of such statements would require "judicial sifting" through
232. The recent draft of the Uniform Mediation Act does not provide a confidentiality
exception for good-faith-participation violations, but does enumerate exceptions relating to
threats to public health and safety, the validity of a mediation agreement, and professional
misconduct. UNEF. MEDIATION ACT § 8 (Proposed Draft Feb. 2001), available at
http://www.pon.harvard.edu/guestsuma/febwebUMA.htm; see Rufenacht, supra note 222, at
133 (describing drafters' deletion of provision that would have permitted a court to lift the veil
of privilege upon a showing of "manifest injustice"); see also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 583.27
(West 2000) (requiring a good-faith obligation in mandatory farmer-lender mediations);
Kirtley, supra note 81, at 50 n.348 ("The Massachusetts and Washington general privileges
specifically exclude labor disputes. In the case of the Washington statute, the exclusion was
sought by interests that wanted to insure continued access to mediation information to prove
claims of 'bad faith' bargaining in labor/management mediations." (citations omitted)). Note
however, that 5 U.S.C. § 574(aX4) provides an exception to ADR confidentiality in federal
administrative ADR proceedings where "a court determines that such testimony or disclosure
is necessary to-(A) prevent manifest injustice." 5 U.S.C. § 574(a)(4) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
233. Foxgate Homeowners Ass'n v. Bramalea Cal., Inc., 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 916,928 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2000), review granted, 999 P.2d 666 (Cal. 2000).
234. 1 ROGERS & MCEWEN, supra note 10, § 9:12, at 32.
When these exceptions depend on the action of the other party after the session,
such as whether the other party challenges the validity of the agreement or argues
a failure to participate in good faith, they may particularly undermine confidence
in the confidentiality of the session. Participants cannot know as the session
unfolds whether their statements will later be disclosed.
Id. § 9:12, at 103.
235. Foxgate, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 929.
236. 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 158 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
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the mediation, thereby disclosing the entire session and undermining participant
confidence in the process. 7 Participants in a compulsory ADR proceeding may be
confronted with the untenable choice of enduring another party's misconduct or
risking sanction themselves by reporting misconduct to a court and thus potentially
violating confidentiality privileges. The plaintiffs in Bernard v. Galen Group, Inc.s
paid such a price after divulging details of their court-ordered mediation, including
settlement offers, in an unsolicited letter sent to the presiding judge complaining of
the defendant's bad-faith conduct in the mediation. 9
4. Role of Third-Party Neutral's Testimony
Permitting disclosures for good-faith-violation claims also raises the concern that
the role of the third-party neutral is compromised where the neutral is a witness to the
alleged bad-faith ADR conduct. Parties as privilege holders may assert or waive the
confidentialityprivilege as to their communications, butmanystatutes are silent about
whether the neutral independently may assert privilege or otherwise be subject to
subpoena.' ° Neutrals have ethical as well as express and implied contractual duties
237. Id. at 162-63 (ruling that evidence of statements made in the course of a mediation are
inadmissible even to establish that parties had reached an oral agreement); see also Bennett v.
Bennett, 587 A.2d 463, 464 (Me. 1991) (requiring a party to sign an agreement allegedly
reached in mediation "would of necessity require the trial court to engage in the time-
consuming process of exploring what transpired between the parties during the course of the
mediation in order to determine if they had reached an agreement"). But see Randle, 1996 WL
447954, at *1 (seeking to introduce as evidence of duress that mediator refused to allow
defendant to leave mediation despite chest pains and history of heart trouble in order to defend
against enforcement of a mediated settlement); UNuF. MEDIATION ACT § 8(b)(2) (Proposed
Draft Feb. 2001) (providing an exception to confidentiality in order to establish the validity and
enforceability of a mediated settlement agreement), available at http://www.pon.harvard.edu/
guests/umalfebwebUMA.htm.
238. 901 F. Supp. 778,783 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). The courtrejected the plaintiff's argumentthat
he had no choice but to breach the broad confidentiality rule in order to report the defendant's
misconduct, stating that he could have objected without divulging specific details of settlement
offers. Id. at 782-83.
239. Id. at 784. The court in Bernard imposed a $2500 fine on an attorney and stated:
"If participants cannot rely on the confidential treatment of everything that
transpires during these [ADR] sessions then counsel of necessity will feel
constrained to conduct themselves in a cautious, tight-lipped, non-committal
manner more suitable to poker players in a high-stakes game than to adversaries
attempting to arrive at ajust resolution of a civil dispute.". . .Participants in the
Mediation Program rely on the understanding that all matters discussed during the
mediation process will be kept confidential, and the breach of the applicable
confidentiality provisions threatens the integrity of the entire Program.
Id. (quoting Lake Utopia Paper Ltd. v. Connelly Containers, Inc. 608 F.2d 928, 930 (2d Cir.
1979)). The plaintiff claimed that the defendant's deliberate misrepresentations to the court
about their good-faith efforts to settle compelled the plaintiffto disclose to the court the details
of the parties' settlement discussions in order to set the record straight. Id.
240. 1 ROGERS & MCEWEN, supra note 10, § 9:16, at 36 (noting that "about half of the
mediation privilege statutes fail to provide who may assert or waive the privilege" but
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tobe impartial and to maintain confidences imparted in anADR session. Recognizing
that confidentiality and the appearance and actual impartiality ofa third-partyneutral
are essential to participants' as well as the public's trust in a mediation process, the
court in NLRB v. Joseph Macaluso, Inc."I recognized a common-law testimonial-
immunity privilege precluding a federal mediator from testifying, even over the
parties' request, about matters in a labor mediation. 2 The court stated:
However useful the testimony of a conciliator might be... in any given case,.
.. [t]he conciliators must maintain a reputation for impartiality, and the parties
to conciliation conference must feel free to talk without any fear that the
conciliator may subsequently make disclosures as a witness in some other
proceeding, to the possible disadvantage of a party to the conference. If
conciliators were permitted or required to testify about their activities, or if the
production of notes or reports of their activities could be required, not even the
strictest adherence to purely factual matters would prevent the evidence from
favoring or seeming to favor one side or the other. 3
Even where proof of bad-faith bargaining is exempt from confidentialityprivileges,
third-party neutrals maybe immune from testifying under a statutory or common-law
testimonial privilege.2' In some instances, however, a neutral may feel compelled to
reportparty misconduct in anADR session.245 Specific legislation or court orders may
suggesting that the appropriate accommodation of interests would be to permit the parties to
waive the privilege as to their own testimony but not as to the mediators').
241. 618 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1980).
242. Id. at 55 (construing the NLRA to preclude federal labor-mediator testimony to avoid
public perception of bias).
243. Id. (citing Tomlinson of High Point, Inc., 74 N.L.R.B. 681, 688 (1947)); see also 5
U.S.C. § 574(a)(4) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (providing that a court may order disclosure by the
neutral (or a party) only if the need for disclosure outweighs "the integrity of dispute resolution
proceedings in general by reducing the confidence of parties in future cases that their
communications will remain confidential"); Folb v. Motion Picture Indus. Pension & Health
Plans, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1178 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (recognizing a federal mediation privilege
where the importance of confidentiality in mediation and in preparation for mediation
outweighed a third party's need for evidence); cf. Smith v. Smith, 154 F.R.D. 661, 674-75
(N.D. Tex. 1994) (questioning the validity ofpopular arguments for recognition of a mediator
privilege as a matter of common law, including the argument that the privilege is needed to
create an appearance of mediator neutrality and to increase the supply of mediators; declining
to recognize a federal common-law mediator privilege).
244. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02 subd. 1(a) (West 2000); see also Kirtley, supra
note 81, at 50-5 1.
[S]ome mediation privilege statutes eliminate confidentiality for claims of bad
faith bargaining in mandatory mediations or simply exclude mediation in which
negotiation in good faith is a legal obligation. While in this context parties should
be free to introduce mediation communications to enforce good faith bargaining
laws, the mediator should not be compelled to testify. It was. on precisely that
issue that the Macaluso and other court decisions provided the genesis of the
mediation privilege.
Id.
245. See Kirtley, supra note 81, at 53 (suggesting a narrow exception to privilege for the
limited situation in which a mediator may feel compelled to breach confidentiality, such as to
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require neutrals to report compliance with good-faith requirements. 2 6 In some cases,
mediator testimony may be the only reliable evidence, and policy considerations for
disclosure outweigh those favoring confidentiality and testimonial inmmunity.
Professor Kirtley finds a good-faith-reporting exception problematic where parties
mediate voluntarily and can simply walk away from the processu but acknowledged
that an exception is warranted "when mediationparties come to the table involuntarily
and under a statutory obligation to bargain in good faith.... In such cases, mediation
communications are essential evidence to prove or defend against a claim of bad faith
bargaining." 9 Professor Kovach also argues that "where a good faith requirement
exists, there should be a concurrent exception to anyrule on confidentiality, since the
communication during the mediation is essential evidence to address the claim of bad
faith in the negotiations."'
Overbroad confidentiality rules should not shield misconduct or process abuse."1
Valid exceptions to confidentiality should be recognized in order to give meaning to
the good-faith requirement and to guard against the abuse potential in compulsory
ADR. The obvious preference is for statutory rules explicitly to address an exception
and the manner for reporting good-faith violations, rather than through post hoc
judicial rules such as in Foxgate. Participants in mandatory private ADR should be
on notice that information relevant to a claim of bad faith, fraud, or misconduct by
a party or neutral may be revealed. The exception for reporting allegations of
misconduct should be limited to claims regarding misuse of the private dispute-
protect a vulnerable person or to prevent an injustice); Kovach, supra note 13, at 585 (noting
a good-faith requirement may involve an expanded role of the third-party neutral; the
"mediator's role, as impartial, and in maintaining all confidences of the proceeding, may have
to be compromised in order to implement a good faith requirement with substance").
246. See supra note 87.
247. Olam v. Cong. Mortgage Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1135-37 (N.D. Cal. 1999)
(balancing the competing policy considerations for confidentiality and mediator statutory
testimonial immunity against the court's need for establishing facts to rule on undue influence
claim); Rinaker v. Superior Court, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 464, 471-72 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998)
(compelling mediator testimony only if necessary to impeach an adverse witness and protect
the defendant's constitutional right).
248. Kirtley, supra note 81, at 50 ("[N]egotiating in bad faith is often in the eyes of the
beholder. Stonewalling or moving in small increments may be justified in particular
mediations. Parties who become frustrated by their opponents' bargaining tactics have the
option ofwithdrawing from the mediation andpursuing othermeans ofresolving the dispute.").
249. Id.
250. Kovach, supra note 13, at 602; see also Kirtley, supra note 81, at 49 (noting that "a
party claiming mediator misconduct must have access to mediation information and the
mediator's testimony"). "A privilege that bars access to such information results in de facto
immunity for malpracticing mediators." Id.
251. Kirtley, supra note 81, at 39 (asserting that "privilege should not permit mediation to
become a blackhole into which the parties can purposefully bury unhelpful evidence").
252. Jamie Alison Lee & Carl Giesler, Case Comments, Confidentiality in Mediation:
Parazino v. Barnett Bank, 690 So. 2d 725 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Bernard v. Galen Group,
901 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N. Y. 1995), 3 HARV.NEG. L. REV. 285,294-95 (1998) (noting that "[i]t
can be difficult to prove bad faith or other participant misconduct without disclosing some
information about the mediation").
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resolution process, as opposed to complaints involving the underlying substantive
claims, defenses, or terms ofsettlement offers. Neutral testimony regarding partybad
faith should be limited to exceptional circumstances where strongpublic interests are
at stake and other sources of evidence are unavailable.
5. In Camera Reporting Procedure
To balance adequately the need for confidentiality and for good-faith participation
in compulsory ADR processes, good-faith participation and the exception for
reporting such violations must be reasonably defined. Whether good faith is defined
to comprise specific objective conduct or a pattern of obstructive tactics, reported
violations wouldnotneed to include information regardingthe substantive exchanges
of the underlying proceeding. 3
To permit a determination of whether a confidentiality privilege exception is
warranted, reports of good-faith violations should be made initially in an in camera
proceeding to the court or neutral, ideally one who is not participating in a discussion
or determination of the case's underlying merits.' The complaining party should
satisfya threshold showing demonstrating another's good-faith-participationviolation
as a prerequisite to public disclosure of the alleged misconduct. 5 The in camera
approach, combined with sanctions for asserting frivolous claims of bad-faith
participation or a fee-shiftingprovision for the prevailingparty, balances the concerns
for ensuring good-faith participation and justified confidentiality in ADR.
253. Kovach, supra note 13, at 602-03 (suggesting the option of a mediator certifying
whether good faith was present, or providing awritten checklist of the parties' conduct to avoid
the problem of the neutral becoming akey witness in bad-faith actions among parties). Kovach
also notes that the "[d]ifficulties encountered in creating a very specific, narrow limited
exception [to confidentiality] for the reporting of violations of a good faith requirement will
be outweighed by the benefits of such obligations." Id. at 602; see also Badie v. Bank of Am.,
79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273, 284 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that "[t]he essence of the good faith
covenant is objectively reasonable conduct" (citations omitted)).
254. Kirtley, supra note 81, at 51-52 n.355 (suggesting an in camera proceeding to resolve
confidentiality and reporting concerns and noting the Texas "procedure to resolve conflicts
between the privileged ADR information and other legal requirements for disclosure" (citing
TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.073(d) (Vernon 1997), and 5 U.S.C. § 574(a)(4),
(b)(5) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (providing that "a court determines... [if] disclosure[s] [are]
necessary to (A) prevent a manifest injustice; (B) help establish a violation of law; or (C)
prevent harm to the public health or safety"))).
255. Olam v. Cong. Mortgage Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (holding that
despite explicit statutoryprovisions rendering mediator incompetent to testify, construed statute
as permitting parties to waive privilege and force mediator to testify); Rinaker v. Superior
Court, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 464, 472-73 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (requiring in camera hearing for
judge to weigh confidentiality of mediation process against constitutional rights of minors to
impeach a witness); Kirtley, supra note 81, at 52 n.356 (explaining that "[i]f a threshold
showing was made by the proponent of the evidence, only then would the court override the
privilege and permit discovery or admissibility of mediation communications").
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VI. CONCLUSION: IN DEFENSE OF THE GOOD-FAriH REQUIREMENT
Despite difficult definitional and policy issues inherent in the enforcement of a
good-faith requirement, the legitimate objectives of ADR-including inter alia,
efficiency, effectiveness, party satisfaction, and fairness-require a duty of good-
faith participation.' The duty is often explicit and even implicit in court-annexed
ADR programs, where courts retain authority to monitor party misconduct. Because
of the potential for process abuse and limits on judicial review, private mandatory
ADR should ensure similar safeguards.
In recognizing a duty of good faith to participate in a contractual ADRprocess, the
objective is to address potential coercion, abuse, and bad-faith conduct. Parties in
private mandatory ADR, particularly those of inferior economic standing or
bargaining power, should know that participant conduct in ADR is not completely
without process rights or responsibilities. Misconduct and procedural manipulations
to delay and obstruct ADR proceedings undermine the efficiency and participation
benefits of ADR and affect possible outcomes. For the process to have legitimacy,
participants in ADR must comply with a minimum standard of good faith. Sanction
or liability would present a "deterrent" to abuse power imbalances, yet provide
meaningful redress when such misconduct occurs. A common-law dutyof good faith,
or corresponding liability for bad faith, provides a necessary check on participant
behavior in a private ADR setting.
A requirement that parties act in good faith in an ADR proceeding may be viewed
as further regulation of a process designed for its flexibility.' Where parties are
required to submit to a private process instead of a judicial forum, however, the
benefits of providing some assurance of fairness to that process outweigh potential
drawbacks.
After-the-fact liability forADRmisconduct is one remedy, andperhaps anecessary
deterrent. A more preventive means would be to set forth specifically the duties,
prohibited conduct, and process rights of the ADR participants in legislation or
private contracts.
Legislative action. A statutory procedure with attendant sanctions for challenging
misconduct as it occurs would provide notice to participants of the good-faith-
participation requirement and deter misconduct in the ADR process.' Federal and
256. Kovach has advocated a good-faith-participation requirement in mediation and
proposed a model statute for good-faith participation applicable to court-annexed and private
mediation. Kovach, supra note 13, at 595, 620, 622-23. Kovach further states that "mediation
... will no longer be viable or of any benefit if the actions demonstrating misuse are allowed
to go unchecked." Id. at 595.
257. Edward F. Sherman, 'Good Faith' Participation in Mediation: Aspirational, Not
Mandatory, DISP. RESOL MAG., Winter 1997, at 14 (asserting that good-faith-participation
requirements "unduly entrenchi] on the voluntariness of settlement").
258. See Kovach, supra note 13, at 603-04 (recommending sanctions for noncompliance
with the good-faith requirement to include "the cost of the mediation; an order directing good
faith participation in asecond mediation, with specific consequences, perhaps as attorneys' fees
plus the cost of the second mediation"). "Such sanctions, while not inordinately punitive, serve




state ADR statutes should provide for a good-faith-participation duty in both private
and court-connected ADR. This provision should identify for each ADR process the
participants' duties, prohibited conduct, essentialprocedural safeguards, enforcement
remedies, and sanctions. 9 In addition, where an award is set aside or a mediated
settlement is granted on grounds of misconduct or fraud, the statute should mandate
recovery for costs, attorneys' fees, and the costs of additional proceedings. Frivolous
or harassing claims of bad-faith participation must also be subject to penalty similar
to the fee-shifting provisions in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Comparable duties undercommon law. Absent legislative change, the common law
provides a basis for finding a duty of good faith and for redressing private ADR
misconduct. As a matter of contract law, private contracts providing for mandatory
arbitration or retention of neutral services carry an implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing to participate in the process. Tort law may also provide recourse against
egregious misconduct or violation of one's duties under theories of bad faith,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, or fraud. Tort theory opens the potential
for recovery for emotional distress and punitive damages.
Explicit contractualprovisions. To clarify the parties' rights and responsibilities
as well as to avoid the uncertainty of a judicial determination of bad-faith
participation, private ADR contracts may express and define the good-faith
obligation. For example:
By agreeing to resolve this dispute in a private, nonjudicial forum, the parties
commit to participate in the process in good faith. This means that at all
scheduled sessions, parties with full settlement authority will appear and will
cooperate in jointly selecting the third-party neutral, abide by deadlines, and
exchange reasonably requested, nonprivileged discovery.
To prevent "contracting out" of a good-faith requirement, contractualprovisions that
purport to absolve one or more of the participants from the good-faith requirement
or limit an aggrieved party's judicial remedies should be unenforceable as against
public policy.2"
The knowledge that participants are under a duty to participate in a private ADR
process in good faith as a matter of law, with attendant liability if that duty is
breached, provides a check on party behavior that will prevent abuse of a dispute
resolution process that is outside the auspices and protection of the judicial system.
The concerns to seek process fairness and punish misconduct must be weighed
against the competing considerations to resist over-regulation of ADR or to create
incentives for satellite litigation, as well as to preserve ADR's flexibility and
259. See Sherman, supra note 5, at 2089-103 (discussing the responsibilities of parties and
their attorneys to participate in court-ordered ADR proceedings); see also Estreicher, supra
note 15, at 1349-50 (discussing Dunlop Commission Report recommendations).
260. Kovach's suggestion that a contractual ADR agreement provide for automatic sanctions
or liquidated damages in case of breach of a good-faith-participation requirement provides
certainty to the parties of potential exposure and is sensible where the parties have truly
consented or are of relative equal bargaining power. See Kovach, supra note 13, at 618. The
danger of permitting parties to limit recovery by contract is that such provisions may be used
as adhesion and effectively circumvent the good-faith obligation altogether.
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confidentiality virtues. Confidentiality privileges, however, should not be used as a
shield for misconduct and should not be absolute, particularly where application
exacerbates the likelihood of abuse. To effectuate both the good-faith requirement
and the need to promote and protect bona fide settlement negotiations and efforts,
confidentiality exceptions should be carefully prescribed and claims of bad-faith
participation subject to controls under Rule 11, requiring reasonable factual support
and penalizing frivolous or harassing claims. An objective definition of prohibited
conduct and a focus on the manner of participation, rather than content of party
offers, should eliminate complaints by disgruntled parties of simply not getting
enough money in settlement.2"'
Any attempt to regulate or define standards of conduct in ADR may be viewed as
incompatible with the flexibility inherent in ADR philosophy. However, because the
baseline tenet of voluntariness is absent in compulsory ADR and the process is now
used in cases of unequal bargaining situations, minimal rules of conduct need to be
explicit. Where conduct is egregious or precludes basic operation of the process
necessary to ensure procedural fairness, such looming liability or oversight is
warranted3 2
Good faith is one step and one aspect of ensuring process fairness. The need to
consider and implement methods for quality control and mechanisms to report
complaints of party or neutral misconduct, abuse, or coercion remains ongoing,
particularly where the use of ADR is mandatory.
261. Id. at 603.
Good faith should not coerce the parties to resolve their dispute on any particular
economic basis. Rather, the good faith requirement is essentially encouragement
for the parties and their counsel to use their best efforts during the process....
Good faith relates to the manner of participation rather than the content.
Id.
262. Id. at 604 (stating that "[a]lthough satellite litigation is not wholly preventable, benefits
of good faith participation in those cases that go to mediation outweigh the detriment of any
potential satellite litigation").
263. See, e.g., Estreicher, supranote 15, at 1349-50 (descnbingDunlop CommissionReport
recommendations for minimal quality safeguards in arbitration).
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